AP Actualidades en**Psicología**

Psychometric properties of a scale of tolerance to corruption using moral dilemmas

Propiedades psicométricas de una escala de tolerancia a la corrupción utilizando dilemas morales

Christian Enrique Cruz Torres [1]
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4286-4697

Tonatiuh Garcia-Campos [2]
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4531-2887

Alejandra del Carmen Domínguez-Espinosa [3]
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2697-8627

Carlos Alberto Montesinos-González [4]
https://orcid.org/0009-0005-4517-9002

Pablo Domínguez-Perera [5]
https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7620-6490

Irene Salas-Menotti [6]
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2690-1574

[1, 2] Universidad de Guanajuato, Departamento de Psicología, Guanajuato, México
[3, 4, 5] Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de México, Departamento de Psicología, Ciudad de México, México
[6] Fundación Universitaria Konrad Lorenz, Bogotá, Colombia

[1] ✉ christian.cruz@ugto.mx   [2] ✉ tonatiuh@ugto.mx   [3] ✉ alejandra.dominguez@ibero.mx   [4] ✉ carlos.montesinos2015@outlook.com
[5] ✉ pablodominguezp39@gmail.com   [6] ✉ irene.salasm@konradlorenz.edu.co

Abstract. *Objective.* Understanding the extent of citizen participation in corrupt practices presents a challenge given that the illicit and socially reprehensible nature of corrupt acts generates a social desirability bias into measures of corruption. The objective was to design a measurement to assess individuals' propensity to either tolerate or resist corruption, employing eight moral dilemmas. *Method.* The instrument was administered to 173 participants for the exploratory factor analysis, followed by 282 participants for the confirmatory factor analysis. *Results.* The results of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis revealed a single factor structure that grouped seven out of the eight dilemmas obtaining optimal goodness-of-fit indices and acceptable reliability. The measurement is useful for future research analyzing corruption.

Keywords. corruption, moral dilemmas, social desirability, validity, psychometry

Resumen. *Objetivo.* Comprender la participación ciudadana en actos de corrupción presenta un desafío, dada la naturaleza ilícita y socialmente reprobable de los actos corruptos genera un sesgo de deseabilidad social en las medidas de corrupción. El objetivo era diseñar una medida para evaluar la propensión de los individuos a tolerar o resistir la corrupción, empleando ocho dilemas morales. *Método.* El instrumento fue administrado a 173 participantes para el análisis factorial exploratorio, seguido de 282 participantes para el análisis factorial confirmatorio. *Resultados.* Los resultados del análisis factorial exploratorio y confirmatorio revelaron una estructura factorial única que agrupó siete de los ocho dilemas obteniendo índices de bondad de ajuste óptimos y una confiabilidad aceptable. La medición es útil para futuras investigaciones que analicen la corrupción.

Palabras clave. corrupción, dilemas morales, deseabilidad social, validez, psicometría

Introduction

For François Valérian, the director of Transparency International, corruption is a global threat that is a key cause of the decline of democracy, instability, and human rights violations (Transparency International, 2025). According to the 2024 Corruption Perception Index, two-thirds of the countries have scores below 50, on a scale of 0 to 100. Since 2012, forty-seven countries have experienced a significant decline in the corruption index, some of them are countries with the lowest corruption indicators (like United States and New Zealand). Throughout the Americas, the country that is most advanced in the index is Uruguay, ranked in thirteenth position. For its part, Oman was the country that obtained the largest increase in the last year (12 points). Mexico, meanwhile, is in position 140, five points below its 2023 ranking.

According to the World Justice Project's ranking (2025), the least corrupt countries are Denmark, Singapore, and Norway, while the most corrupt are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia, and Bolivia. Uruguay ranks 22nd, while Mexico ranks 134th.

Corruption definition and classification

While some investigative approaches narrowly focus on public officials, defining corruption as the misuse of public office for personal gain, a more comprehensive perspective is imperative for countries like Mexico, where corruption permeates various levels of the state. Such an approach must encompass citizen participation as a crucial element that either enables or contributes to this entrenched issue. Acknowledging that the responsibility for monitoring the proper execution of public functions lies not only with government bodies but also with the citizenry, it becomes evident that the chronic corruption witnessed in Mexico cannot be fully comprehended without considering the acquiescence or active participation of citizens in corrupt practices. Consequently, potential solutions to this problem necessitate a profound understanding of citizen involvement in these acts, whether for personal gain, reporting, or socially condemning those involved.

By adopting a broader perspective, Sutherland (1940) defines corruption as a breach of delegated or implicit trust. This perspective allows us to envision citizens as agents who share responsibility with the government in upholding laws, refraining from engaging in corruption, and demanding accountability and punishment for wrongdoers. Taking a more operational approach, Transparency International (2020) characterizes corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, classifying it into large-scale (occurring at the highest levels of government), political (employed by decision-makers to manipulate resource allocation for personal benefit), and minor (practiced by public officials in their routine interactions with ordinary citizens). , aAddressing this pervasive issue, especially within the context of minor corruption, necessitates considering citizens not just as victims but as active participants and stakeholders in the quest for solutions.

Guzmán and Ponce (2017) shed light on the relatively subdued attention given to "small-scale" corruption compared to high-profile cases of large-scale corruption. Nystrand (2014) further posits that this disparity may be attributed to reduced interest from both the media and the public, resulting in these acts not being fully recognized as integral components of the broader corruption phenomenon. Zúñiga et al. (2019) caution that "small-scale" corrupt practices often dwell in ethically ambiguous territories, involving ordinary individuals who may not fully comprehend that their actions can be classified as detrimental to society. Such actions are notably pronounced in developing nations, where the demarcation between the private and public spheres is often blurred, and formal regulatory frameworks are inadequately established (Sandoval, 2016). Additionally, individuals occupying public office maintain dual roles: as citizens, they bear the responsibility of upholding and monitoring the rule of law, yet they possess the potential to both benefit from and propagate corruption.

Within this context, a comprehensive analysis

of the psychological processes underpinning decision-making regarding corruption becomes indispensable. Such an analysis not only aids in understanding the behavior of citizens at large but also provides valuable insights into the conduct of those in public offices.

Corruption as a form of cooperation

This study delves into the concept of cooperation as a pivotal element within the decision-making process when contemplating involvement in corrupt acts. It frames the decision to engage in corruption as a moral dilemma: a choice between cooperating with individuals proposing corruption to obtain immediate local advantages or cooperating with the broader framework of the rule of law to foster fewer tangible benefits, such as the realization of a society characterized by a robust rule of law, along with the security and stability it affords.

The term "corruption" often carries a predominantly negative connotation due to its detrimental impact on social systems. However, it is essential to acknowledge that the perspective on corruption may differ for those who engage in such practices. Experimental studies (Muthukrishna et al., 2017; Murray et al., 2017) have highlighted that participation in corrupt acts inherently involves cooperation with another party, both of whom stand to benefit from the illicit activity. For instance, in a bribery scenario, the individual offering the bribe avoids a potential penalty, while the recipient retains the bribe. Both parties operate under the shadow of possible exposure by the other, leading to the risk of corresponding consequences. This cooperative dimension embedded within decisions related to corruption may lead to a more favorable assessment, contrasting with the seemingly distant negative aspects of corruption, especially when individuals lack close affiliation with proponents of the rule of law who can provide an alternative perspective.

Cooperation can be defined as the practice where individuals or groups invest a portion of their resources (e.g., time, money, effort) in collaborative efforts with others to achieve mutual benefits (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). In cooperative endeavors, an individual willing to incur costs for the collective benefit is referred to as a "cooperator," while someone who avoids these costs still reaps the reward is termed a "deserter" (Nowak, 2006). While the process of evolution inherently involves competition, where selfish behaviors are often rewarded, cooperation remains indispensable for the development of advanced social structures (Nowak, 2006). These intricate social systems give rise to collective goods, which vary in their capacity for exclusion and the degree to which they are susceptible to exploitation. For example, failing to purchase a concert ticket results in exclusion from the event, whereas refraining from contributing to private street surveillance does not prevent an individual from enjoying the benefits, making exclusion difficult. Moreover, these resources vary to the extent to which they can be exploited. When a car is purchased, it becomes unavailable to others, whereas the public transportation system remains partially accessible to multiple users (Ostrom, 2003, 2010).

This research focuses on common-pool resources, characterized by their substantial size, making exclusion feasible, and their vulnerability to depletion due to exploitation, resulting in quantifiable deterioration (Ostrom, 2011). Examples include timber forests and tax revenue. The overuse of such resources, driven by individuals pursuing immediate personal gains, can lead to resource depletion, jeopardizing the system's ability to regenerate itself. This phenomenon, known as the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2011), illustrates the consequences of individuals prioritizing their immediate interests, ultimately leading to the exhaustion of shared resources and societal detriment.

Tolerance of Corruption and moral dilemmas

When individuals are confronted with the ethical dilemma of engaging in corruption, they are, in fact, presented with a third option: reporting the proposed corruption. Bribery, for example, invol-

ves three key participants: the briber, the bribee, and potential witnesses to the transaction. Acting against those involved in acts of corruption, whether through legal channels or social means, such as reprimanding them for their actions or socially isolating them, has been examined within the framework of altruistic punishment. This concept is labeled "altruistic" because individuals who exercise this form of punishment invest their time and effort, sometimes even risking reprisals, without expecting immediate rewards. Instead, they derive satisfaction from doing what they perceive as morally right, ultimately benefiting the broader societal system while raising the costs for those who transgress the rule in question.

Experimental investigations have demonstrated that under controlled conditions, altruistic punishment can effectively reduce defection and incentivize participants to contribute their resources to a common pool, reminiscent of tax payment or evasion (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Results from these studies indicated that, given the opportunity to penalize non-cooperators, a significant number of participants chose to do so, leading to a notable decrease in non-cooperative behaviors and a considerable increase in resource contributions.

However, in contrast to the high propensity for altruistic punishment observed in the studies conducted by Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), subsequent research has shown that individuals are less inclined to punish others unless they have personally experienced the negative consequences of non-cooperative actions (Pedersen et al., 2018). Moreover, this disposition towards altruistic punishment appears to be virtually non-existent in real-world scenarios outside the controlled laboratory environment (Pedersen et al., 2020).

This low willingness to act against those who engage in corruption has been interpreted as a tolerance of corruption. For example, Gong and Wang (2013) have focused on a zero-tolerance measure for corruption that includes indicators such as showing no sympathy with corruption; being willing to report instances of corruption; and supporting strict law enforcement, being tough even on minor offences. Previous studies have used measurements of tolerance to corruption based on beliefs that justify it (Carrasco & Pavón, 2021; González-Ramírez, & Monsiváis-Carrillo, 2022; Cruz Torres et al., 2020), showing that a greater tolerance for corruption is associated with a lower perception of corruption (Liu, et al., 2022; Carrasco & Pavón, 2021) and a lower willingness to act against it (Cruz Torres et al., 2020). Although, the results of Costa-Lopes et al. (2025) show that a greater perception of corruption in society leads to less tolerance towards it, especially in situations of economic crisis.

This study delves into the intricate interplay of cooperation, corruption, and the complex phenomenon of altruistic punishment, shedding light on the factors that influence individuals' decisions to enforce ethical norms and the implications for maintaining a cooperative and just social order.

Acts of corruption, apart from their illegality, carry a pronounced negative social stigma. Conversely, actions taken against those involved in corruption often hold a positive social connotation. These characteristics introduce a potential social desirability bias in the measurement of corruption, a bias where respondents are inclined to underreport their involvement in corrupt activities while exaggerating their commitment to combating corruption (Krumpal, 2013). To mitigate this bias, an alternative for the measurement of corruption and its variables is the utilization of anonymous online surveys, which reduce the impact of respondents' motivation to present a favorable self-image, both to the interviewer and themselves.

Furthermore, assessing the propensity to commit corrupt acts should be largely independent of the opportunities available for such actions. For instance, individuals who spend extended hours driving may encounter more opportunities to violate traffic rules compared to those with less driving time. These disparities in opportunity levels create complexities in measuring different forms of corruption

and underscore a significant challenge in corruption research. One effective strategy to address this challenge involves gauging willingness to engage in corrupt behaviors (e.g., "What would you do?") rather than relying solely on past involvement (e.g., "What have you done?"). This approach is particularly useful when capturing individuals' moral orientations in ethical dilemmas. The moral dilemmas used in the instrument proposed here have the advantage of placing the participant in the role of decision-maker, and not just of giving an opinion regarding the corruption of other people or the government.

Moral dilemmas, comprising brief narratives presenting situations that require individuals to choose between conflicting moral principles, offer an avenue to elicit responses that reflect the willingness to engage in corrupt behaviors. In these dilemmas, the inherent incompatibility of the options presented (e.g., choosing one option precludes the realization of the other) and their consequences (e.g., gains for one party correspond to losses for another) should be explicitly outlined (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). These options can be dichotomous (e.g., to perform or not an action), but in this project, we are interested in measuring the extent to which participants would be willing to tolerate and even support some acts of corruption by people close to them, which implies that the response options of each dilemma, in addition to being incompatible, represent increases in tolerance to corruption, generating an ordinal measurement.

Considering the persistent and stark challenges posed by corruption in Mexico and Latin America and its accurate measurement, this study seeks to address this challenge by creating a measurement instrument that is both valid and reliable in assessing individuals' willingness to tolerate or combat acts of corruption, using moral dilemmas as a means of evaluation. Although the dilemmas deal with different possible forms of corruption, they all clearly point to this type of act and to a close actor (e.g., a family member or friend) who can be helped

or denounced. For this reason, it was hypothesized that this approach will yield a unidimensional scale with appropriate goodness-of-fit indicators.

Method

A quantitative, non-experimental, cross-sectional, and psychometric design was used.

Participants

To verify whether the answer options for each dilemma increase ordinally, the dilemmas were applied to a first sample of 31 women and 18 men with an average age of 24.47 with an SD=8.39, residents of Guanajuato. For the exploratory factor analysis, 169 people participated, 85 women and 84 men, mainly from the states of Guanajuato (58%), Mexico City (19%), Michoacán (6%), Jalisco (3%), Puebla (3%), Estado de México (2%), among others (9%), with an average age of 32.31 (SD=14.19). For the confirmatory factor analysis, a second sample of 282 participants was collected, 42.6% men and 56.4% women, with an average age of 29 years (SD=11.01), 75% residents of Guanajuato, 5% from Mexico City, 5% from Jalisco, 5% from Baja California and the remaining 8% from other states. The procedure was reviewed and accepted by the Institutional Committee of Bioethics in Research of the Guanajuato University (CIBIUG-P16-2021).

Instruments

The "moral dilemmas to measure tolerance to corruption" instrument comprises eight moral dilemmas, wherein participants are prompted to envision scenarios involving a close acquaintance (e.g., a friend) on the verge of engaging in corrupt acts (e.g., falsely reporting others' receipts to claim tax deductions). Table 1 presents the main idea of each dilemma. Respondents were presented with five response options increasing progressively the tolerance of corruption, ranging from the lowest tolerance (e.g., refusing to support the act and contemplating reporting it) to the highest tolerance (e.g., willingly assisting the friend in the corrupt endea-

Table 1. Summary of the moral dilemmas of tolerating corruption

1. Your neighbor and friend is wanted by the police for bribing officials. You know where he is, but your friend asks you not to betray him.

2. A coworker is being investigated for faking theft of a laptop and asks you to give testimony on his behalf, but you know he is guilty.

3. One of your cousins asks you to hold onto three boxes, but you realize they contain stolen goods.

4. A friend at your work is trying to sell a cell phone that one of your coworkers lost.

5. One of your nephews asks you to lend him money to buy the answer key to an entrance exam for a prestigious school.

6. One of your relatives asks you to keep the receipts for all your purchases so that he can pass them off as if they were expenses of his business.

7. You are on the team that evaluates candidates for management positions. One of the stronger candidates is your friend, and you know that he pays to get his master's degree without studying.

8. One of your friends is stopped by a patrol and asks you for money to bribe the police officer.

Note. Item 3 was eliminated due to low factor loadings in the exploratory factor analysis

vor) (see Appendix A). For the first 49 participants who checked whether the answer options increased tolerance to corruption in an ordinal manner, they were instructed to order the options in each dilemma according to their level of tolerance to corruption, having as answer options 1 (Minimum tolerance to corruption), 2 (A little tolerance to corruption), 3 (Intermediate tolerance of corruption), 4 (High tolerance of corruption) and 5 (Maximum tolerance of corruption). The rest of the participants were instructed to answer what they would do in each dilemma, selecting the answer option that best represented what they would do in that case.

Procedure

Given the prohibitive costs of having a representative sample, a convenience sample, not a representative sample, was obtained. Data from as many regions of the country were obtained through contacts of colleagues in other universities in Mexico, who supported the dissemination of the invitation to the study through social networks. Inclusion criteria were established to be over 18 years of age and have a full-time job, trying to ensure that those who participate have greater civic responsibili-

ties and thus greater probabilities of having faced or witnessed acts of corruption. To reduce potential social desirability biases, the survey was conducted online, thus avoiding face-to-face interaction and making the data collection process more efficient. Upon entering the research acceptance link, participants were presented with the information sheet, which emphasized that their participation was voluntary and that they could abandon the survey at any time without any consequences. They were informed that their data would be analyzed only for scientific research purposes and their confidentiality would be protected by the main researcher. Also, contact information for the principal investigator and the president of the Ethics Committee was provided. Finally, those who agreed to participate marked a box with that option and clicked on a link that took them to the questionnaire.

Analysis strategy

To verify whether the answer choices for each dilemma did indeed represent behaviors with ordinal increases of tolerance for corruption, the concordance of the responses of the 49 participants who participated in this part of the study was analyzed

using Kendall's W for each dilemma. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted utilizing Factor software (Ferrando & Seva, 2017). The analysis involved assessing the polychoric correlation matrix's factorization viability, as determined by the Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) indicator, with values equal to or greater than 0.7, and statistically significant results in the Bartlett test. The determination of the optimal number of dimensions to extract was based on parallel analysis, as per the approach proposed by Timmerman and Lorenzo-Seva (2011), contrasting with the theoretically expected dimensions. The extraction of factors employed the robust diagonally weighted least squares method which is suitable for ordinal response options such as those used in this instrument (Muthén et al., 1997). Subsequently, interpretation of the rotated matrix was achieved using the robust promin method, which is compatible with the diagonally weighted least squares method used for the extraction of factors, as outlined by Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando (2019).

To ensure the robustness of the factors, criteria were established for retaining or discarding items. Factors were retained if they exhibited at least three indicators with loadings of 0.4 or higher, without equivalent loadings in other factors. Furthermore, internal consistency was calculated using McDonald's omega (Dunn et al., 2014) which is more suitable for ordinal items that do not meet the requirements of normality or tau-equivalence (Trizano-Hermosilla & Alvarado, 2016) such as those used in this scale. Additionally, factors were retained if they aligned conceptually with the theoretical model. Factors that did not meet these criteria were excluded.

The goodness of fit for the model was evaluated based on several criteria, including non-significant Chi-squared values, a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.08 or less, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) values exceeding 0.90, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) values above 0.90, and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) values equal to or greater than 0.95.

Confirmatory factor analysis was performed using the diagonally weighted least squares method to estimate discrepancies. The goodness of fit was considered adequate when the RMSEA was 0.08 or less, CFI exceeded 0.95, GFI was greater than 0.90, and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) was 0.08 or less, following the criteria set forth by Brown (2015).

Internal consistency was assessed using the McDonald's omega formula (Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel & Li, 2005). Confirmatory factor analysis and McDonald's omega were made on JASP software (2023).

Results

The agreement analyses to verify whether the answer choices vary ordinally show Kendall's W values between $W=.78$, $df=4$, $p<.001$ and $W=.94$, $df=4$, $p<.001$ for each of the eight dilemmas, showing significant levels of agreement in the ordinal increase that each answer option represents in the tolerance to corruption.

For the exploratory factor analysis, the examination of the polychoric correlations matrix revealed statistically significant values in the Bartlett statistic ($\chi^2=328.00$, $df=21$, $p<.001$) and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value of .81, indicating the matrix's suitability for factor analysis. As illustrated in Table 2, the exploratory factor analysis yielded a unifactorial solution that retained seven out of the eight dilemmas, elucidating 57.38% of the total variance. Dilemma three was removed because it had a factor load of less than .3. The goodness-of-fit indicators indicated that the differences between the single-factor model and the observed solution were not statistically significant ($\chi^2=20.69$, $p=.11$), obtaining adequate goodness-of-fit indicators (CFI=.95, GFI=.99, TLI=.94; RMSEA=.08, CI 90% [.03, .11]).

The results of the confirmatory factor analysis provide strong support for the goodness of fit indicators associated with a seven-item factor solution. There were no statistically significant discrepancies between the model and the observed data ($\chi^2=10.58$, $df=14$, $p=.71$). Hoelter's critical N (CN=633.99), exceeding 200, indicates that the sample size allows the model to adequately reproduce

Table 2. Exploratory Factor Analysis, Reliability, and Descriptive Statistics of Tolerance to Corruption Measurement Using Moral Dilemmas

Omega	0.71
Median of the sum	16
Minimum/maximum sum	7/27
Covering for a friend who lies about his education for getting a promotion	.704
Lending money to a friend to bribe a police officer	.686
Giving a friend receipts to evade taxes	.638
Covering up for a friend who reported a computer stolen from work to keep it for himself	.614
Covering up for a nephew who's going to buy test answers	.574
Covering up for a friend who sold a cell phone he found knowing who the owner is	.543
Hide a friend who is wanted by the police for bribery	.501

Note. The polychoric correlation matrix was analyzed using the diagonal-weighted least squares extraction method.

Figure 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Tolerance to Corruption Measurement Using Moral Dilemmas

Note. Unstandardized factor loadings and standard errors for each item towards the latent variable are shown.

the observed covariance structure (Hoelter, 1983). The relationships in the model were significantly different from those of a null model, as indicated by a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of 1. Additionally, a substantial proportion of the total variance was explained (GFI=.99), with minimal residuals remaining after extracting the variance associated with the common factor (SRMR=.03). Furthermore, these results can be extrapolated to the broader population, as indicated by the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of less than .001, with a 90% confidence interval ranging from less than .001 to .04. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the goodness of fit of the scale is indeed adequate.

All the loadings of the observed variables on the common factor were found to be statistically significant, with standardized values (z-scores) ranging from 10.33 to 16.66, all with p-values less than .001. Figure 1 shows non-standardized loadings and residual values for every item.

Discussion

For the convenience of readers, the complete instrument is presented in Appendix A. One important caveat to acknowledge regarding this instrument is that it assesses hypothetical scenarios of corruption rather than factual instances committed by the surveyed individuals. Nonetheless, this methodologically sound approach remains indispensable, given the inherent challenges associated with directly measuring real-world corruption. It is worth noting that the average scores of the sample are just below the theoretical mean, indicating that people would not be entirely against performing these acts. These data differ from previous studies in Mexico such as that of Cruz et al. (2020), where minimum scores for justification of corruption are observed. This may be because the dilemmas on this new scale place the reader in a more realistic condition, where the possible gains from corruption and the costs of not participating in it are clear, both in material terms (e.g. saving a fine) and in social terms, since they involve helping or not helping another person in the close social circle. This can imply a good middle point between traditional measurements, where people hardly recognize having committed an act of corruption, and experimental procedures where the aim is to model the decision to be corrupt in each scenario through economic games, although with more expensive procedures (e.g., Duarte & Cruz, 2024). However, it must be acknowledged that the use of dilemmas instead of statements, while designed to generate greater participant engagement and make the costs of not tolerating corruption more evident, involves a longer response time than the use of statements, as employed by Carrasco and Pavón (2021) or Cruz et al. (2020). The use of dilemmas, by offering more contextual information, also implies a greater risk of ambiguity in interpretation, especially in different cultural contexts, as already identified by Liu et al. (2022). Further research is also needed to explore the use of this scale in relation to other variables, for example, to try to explain actual corrupt practices or to identify factors that affect tolerance of corruption. In the pursuit of enhanced validation, future research avenues could explore external criteria, such as cross-referencing with other established corruption measurement tools or integrating experimental studies to assess decisions qualified as corruption. Such endeavors would further bolster the validity and applicability of this valuable instrument.

The Tolerance to Corruption measurement tool is a short scale, characterized by a stable and theoretically sound factorial structure, and boasting commendable levels of internal consistency. It stands as a valuable resource for forthcoming investigations into the multifaceted scope of corruption and its underlying causes. Subsequent studies will play a pivotal role in assessing the validity and reliability of this instrument across diverse populations, considering that the present study predominantly focused on residents of the central region of Mexico.

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Appendix A

Assessing tolerance to corruption through moral dilemmas

1. A few weeks ago, your neighbor and friend confessed to you that he had achieved a very good deal with the government to open his business but had had to bribe some officials. Today calls and informs you that he had a problem related to that business and that the police are looking for him. He tells you that he is hiding in a relative´s house and asks you not to say anything about the situation. Upon arriving at your house, you finds several police officers at your neighbor's house. One of them comes up to you and asks if your friend is still living there, when you last saw him, and where they might find him. What would you do? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case.

Check only one option.

(1)   Tell the police officer where to find your friend and offer to be an anonymous witness regarding the information you know about him and his business.

(2)   Tell the police officer that he lives there but hide the information about where to find him..

(3)   Deny that you know your neighbor and tell the officer you don't know who lives at that address.

(4)   Heed your friend's request and tell the police officer he has not lived in that address in a long time.

(5)   Heed your friend's request and offered to be a character witness if that helps him in the process.

2. One of your friends at work reported a few weeks ago that he was the victim of a robbery, and among other things, he lost the laptop that the company gave him to work. However, over the weekend you found your friend in a cafe using the laptop that had allegedly been stolen, which you could recognize by the company logo. Today, at work your boss is interviewing staff to investigate the case because it is the third computer that your friend reports as stolen. Your friend asks you to please tell your boss that he is an honest person and to try to convince them that he would be unable to do something illegal. When you are called for the interview, you are asked if you know or have seen anything that makes you suspect that your co-worker is lying about that theft. What would you answer? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case.

(1)   Tell your boss that you saw your friend using the computer after it was allegedly stolen and offer yourself as an anonymous witness if they report him for theft.

(2)   Tell them that you thought you saw your friend using the computer after it had allegedly been stolen but refuse to participate in any investigation as a witness.

(3)   Tell your boss you don't know anything.

(4)   Tell them that you have never seen anything that makes you think your friend would have done something like that.

(5)   Tell your boss that you haven't seen anything, that your friend has always been a good person, and try to convince them that he would never do something like that.

3[1]. One of your cousins, with whom he has a good relationship, comes to your house asking for a space in your house to store three boxes of merchandise for a week that he is going to sell to earn money. You have enough space to store the boxes, but when you see them, you realize that the boxes contain medicine owned by the government marked with the legend "Property of the Health Sector. Not for sale. Please report your sale to 54-25-...." What would you do? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case. (This dilemma was eliminated from the final version of the instrument because it did not meet good indicators from the exploratory factor analysis).

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1   Item 3 was eliminated due to low factor loadings in the exploratory factor analysis

(1)   Refusing to put the boxes away and asking your cousin to return that merchandise, or else you would report that he has them yourself.

(2)   Refusing to put the boxes away and trying to convince your cousin to return the merchandise.

(3)   Although you do have space, you would refuse to keep the boxes arguing that you have nowhere to store them, but you would tell him nothing about them being the property of the government.

(4)   You would tell your cousin that it is not right to sell this merchandise but keep the boxes for him as he asks.

(5)   You would keep the boxes for his cousin without mentioning anything else.

4. A co-worker whom you only know in passing has been asking for help around the office because he lost a cell phone, he had bought just a week ago. To recognize his phone, he has his name engraved on it. Weeks later, one of your friends from work asks you to help share on your social media that he is selling an almost new phone. Upon seeing it, you realize that it´s your coworker´s lost phone and that the engraving has been scraped off. What would you do? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case.

(1)   You wouldn´t help your friend sell the phone and ask him to return it to its owner, telling him that you would tell your coworker who has it if he does not return it.

(2)   You wouldn't help your friend sell the phone and try to convince them to return it, but you would leave the decision in their hands.

(3)   You would say yes to your friend, but you wouldn't share anything on your social media, although you also wouldn't tell your coworker who has the phone.

(4)   You would tell your friend that it is not right to keep that phone because you know who owns it, but you would still help him sell it on your social media.

(5)   You would help your friend sell the phone without telling him anything else.

5. One of your nephews is taking a course to prepare for the exam to enter a prestigious high school with high levels of rejection. Your nephew writes you a message confessing that he has not studied as he should and is worried about not passing the exam and that his parents will realize that he has not taken advantage of the course. He tells you that at the institute where he takes the course someone is willing to sell him the answer key for the entrance test, but he has no money to buy them and asks you to please lend him the money, but not to tell his parents. Assuming you have enough money to lend him, what would you do in this situation? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case.

(1)   You wouldn't lend him the money, make it clear that what he is doing isn't right, and tell him to talk to his parents about it or you'd go tell them yourself.

(2)   You wouldn't lend him the money and try to convince him that that's not the right way to do things.

(3)   Even if you had the money, I would tell him that you have no money to lend him, without telling him anything else.

(4)   You would lend him the money, but I would tell him that this is not the right way to do things and that he must devote more himself to studying if he wants to get into that school.

(5)   You would lend him the money without telling him anything else.

6. One of your relatives, whom you are fond of, works as a freelancer and files taxes every year, taking advantage of some expense deductions. To pay less taxes, your relative asks you to keep the receipts for all your purchases so that he can pass them off as if they were expenses of his business. What would you do in this situation? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case.

(1)   You would tell him that you are not giving him your receipts and make it clear to him that what he is doing is tax fraud and that you don't want to participate in it.

(2)   You would tell him that you are not giving him your receipts and try to convince him that it is not right.

(3)   You would say yes, but you would not keep any receipts for him and tell him later that you forgot.

(4)   You would give him your receipts, but you would tell him that it is just this one time because that does not seem right to you.

(5)   You would keep as many receipts as you could and give them to him without a problem.

7. One of your friends at work tells you that he is pursuing a master's degree in finance at a private university, but that he pays an extra monthly to the school to pass the courses without studying or handing in homework, and that the school will award his degree anyway. One year later, you are on the team that evaluates candidates for management positions. You find out that one of the stronger candidates is that friend, and that one of the advantages your boss points out about him is his master´s degree in finance. What would you do in this situation? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case.

(1)   I would talk to my boss and tell them that my friend paid to get the degree but did none of the coursework required.

(2)   I would ask my friend to withdraw his candidacy for the position, or else I would tell our boss that he bought the degree.

(3)   I wouldn't tell our boss that your friend's title is fake, but I would recommend that they value other candidates' skills.

(4)   I wouldn't say anything to our boss, but I would talk to my friend about finding a way to train in finance to avoid problems with the position.

(5)   I would speak well to my boss about my friend to convince them that he is the ideal candidate for the job.

8. At the end of a meeting with co-workers, you notice that one of your friends has had too much to drink and may not be able to drive home. Although you try to convince him, he insists that he is fine and can drive, so you decide to escort him by driving behind him to see that he arrives home well. Less than half a block from his house, he is stopped by a patrol car and the police officer tries to detain your friend and impound his car for drunk driving. Your friend agrees to give the officer money if they let him go. Your friend doesn't have enough money and asks to borrow money from you. Assuming you have enough money to lend your friend, what would you do in that situation? Please read the following options and select the one that most closely resembles what you would do in that case.

(1)   I Don't lend him the money, and tell my friend that if he insists, I'll report him and the police officer for corruption.

(2)   I Don't lend him the money and try to make my friend understand that giving money to cops is not right.

(3)   Even if I did have the money, I would tell my friend that I would lend it to him but lie and tell him I don´t have any money.

(4)   I'd lend the money to my friend, but I'd make it clear to him that what he is doing is not right and that this is the last time I do something like that.

(5)   I would lend the money to my friend without any issue.