Dreaming of Reform: University Intellectuals during the Lemus regime and the Civic-Military Junta in El Salvador (1960-1961)

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Dreaming of Reform: University Intellectuals during the Lemus regime and the Civic-Military Junta in El Salvador (1960-1961)

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Introduction

Lieutenant-Colonel José María Lemus, a protégé of President Oscar Osorio (1950-1956), rose to power in 1956. Lemus is often remembered as an authoritarian ruler, but at the outset of his presidency he allowed the return of exiles and abolished the “Law in Defense of Democratic and Constitutional Order,” sanctioned during Osorio’s anti-communist crackdown in 1952. Lemus governed El Salvador during a period of declining prosperity as coffee prices plunged in the international markets, forcing an economic restructuring which had particularly negative consequences for the poor. But more importantly, the changing political landscape in Latin America posed enormous challenges to Lemus, as opposition forces ousted Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez in January 1958 and revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro took power in Cuba in January 1959. Political events in Venezuela and Cuba inspired a new wave of mobilization in El Salvador led by the recently formed Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo (PRAM) and Frente Nacional de Orientación Cívica (FNOC) which challenged Lemus’ authoritarian regime.1 While the local press followed step by step events in Cuba as reported by U.S. press agencies, Lemus and the Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (PRUD), the official party, showed a renewed determination to prevent the spread of “Cuban-inspired subversion” in El Salvador. To this end, Sidney Mazzini, a representative of the PRUD at the National Assembly envisioned the formation of what he termed a “sanitary cordon” around Cuba.2

Scholars generally agree that the Lemus regime oscillated between a partial political opening and repression. Assessing Lemus’ presidency, Tommie Sue Montgomery (1995) wrote: “the 1950s provided sufficient political latitude to permit the development of several center-to-left leaning organizations. As demands for reform increased, however, the [Lemus] regime grew more defensive. Increased repression produced more opposition.”3 Paul D. Almeida (2008) posits that “collective military rule,” which promoted economic modernization between 1948 and 1962, fluctuated between restricted political openings and repression. Emerging social movements and political parties such as PRAM “benefited from the early years of Lemus’ reforms, which lifted the special state of emergency, allowed the return of exiles, and permitted the support of labor mobilizations and national conferences.” Almeida also points out that social movements and left opposition forces overthrew Lemus in October 1960 and enjoyed “almost three months under a progressive civil-military Junta” which ended with the “conservative military” coup of January...
1961. According to Almeida, security forces “massacred protesting civilians” during the coup; an event that led the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) to sponsor the formation of “an underground guerrilla organization” the Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria (FUAR).4

I concur with Montgomery’s and Almeida’s characterization of the Lemus regime and the Civic Military Junta (26 October 1960- 25 January 1961). However, I wish to revisit the crucial events of 1960 and 1961 to examine the impact of cold war politics in El Salvador during the initial years of the Cuban revolution, focusing on the participation of university intellectuals in the ousting of Lemus and the short-lived reformist Junta.5 More to the point, in what follows I attempt an empirical reconstruction of these events to explore their effects on the political perceptions and political culture of university intellectuals in the early 1960s.6

“To Combat Communism in El Salvador”

The confrontation between the Lemus regime and the opposition, which involved a segment of the university community, can be better explained in the context of the growing impact of the cold war in Central America, particularly at the start of the Cuban Revolution. At this time, the Eisenhower administration showed a rising concern over Lemus’ inability to fight “communism” in El Salvador, that is, to curtail the opposition movement against his regime, particularly at the University and in trade unions.

In the late 1950s El Salvador seemed to be a relatively stable nation amidst the increasingly volatile situation in Central America and the Caribbean. In this context, the Lemus government became a showcase for U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. In 1958, State Department officials prepared a “full state visit” for Lemus, partly to show that U.S. –Latin American relations were not in such dire straits as the rough reception Vice-President Richard Nixon had received during a recent visit to various South American capitals might have suggested.7 State Department officials concocted an elaborate state visit for Lemus, which included an address by Lemus address to a joint session of U.S. Congress, a meeting with President Eisenhower, and private diners with Nelson Rockefeller and other influential businessman in New York City. But privately they harbored concerns about Lemus apparent laxity fighting “communism” in El Salvador.8 “Communists” had allegedly taken advantage of Lemus’ political opening to gain substantial leverage at the University of El Salvador, in trade unions and amongst the local press.
Lemus “was shocked out of [his] complacency by large communist gains that became apparent at the national labor congress [sponsored by Lemus] in March 1957.” At this time, according to a State Department report, “communists” had ostensibly gained control over a provisional committee in charge of drafting the bylaws of a new trade union confederation. Then, in August 1957, “top Communists labor leaders” organized a new labor congress and formed the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CGTS). To counter them, Lemus supported the creation of the General Confederation of Salvadoran Unions (CGS) in May 1958.9 Lemus followed a similar line at the University of El Salvador where he supported the formation of anti-communist student organizations at the Law School where “communist” influence was supposedly stronger. Despite these efforts, the State Department officials remained doubtful about Lemus’ capacity to effectively fight communism.10

Analysts at the State Department’s Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (OCPA) had ambivalent readings of the strength of the PCS in the late 1950s. On the one hand, they believed, the PCS had been “an ineffectual, clandestine organization” for most of its history that “appear[ed] to lack the capability to seize power by force or to gain political control through democratic processes.” On the other hand, OCPA officers showed concern about the potential of the PCS to influence university and national politics.11 According to C. Allan Stewart, the director of OCPA, the PCS endorsed Dr. Arturo Romero, a charismatic figure in the struggle against dictator Hernández Martínez in 1944, as a candidate for the Rector of the University of El Salvador in February1959. Romero returned to El Salvador from exile in Costa Rica at this time and received, in the words of Stewart, “a tumultuous reception” in San Salvador, and he was quickly labeled the “Fidel Castro of El Salvador.” Romero did not accept the post of Rector and returned to Costa Rica, but the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador showed a great deal of concern about these events.12

Thorsten Kalijarvi, the U.S. Ambassador in El Salvador, also expressed his dissatisfaction with Lemus’ efforts “to combat communism in El Salvador.” “The Ambassador reports that two years of efforts by the Embassy and the OAS [the Organization of American States] of suggesting the Government of El Salvador methods of combating communism have not been very fruitful,” reads a memo written by Stewart in preparation for Lemus’ state visit to the U.S. in March 1959. All in all, State Department officials thought it necessary to raise Lemus’ apparent lack of resolve or skill to combat communism in El Salvador as a central issue during Lemus’ state visit to the U.S.13
U.S. labor officers were also actively involved in anti-communist activities during the Lemus regime. Serafino Romualdi, the international representative of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) and Andrew McClellan, the Latin American representative of the International Federation of Food and Drink Workers, met Ambassador Kalijarvi in March 1959 to express their concern about Lemus apparent lack of will to curtail the activities of the CGTS. The CGTS planned to hold a new congress in San Salvador in April 1960 which leaders of the pro-government CGS bitterly opposed. CGS leaders thought that the CGTS meeting would not be a real labor congress but “a pro-Castro, anti-United States gathering in which left-wing student, political, and intellectual groups will participate.” This event, according to Romualdi and McClellan, was part of a larger trend of “communist penetration” in Central America and the Caribbean. Anti-communist trade unions in the region were “on the verge of panic” with regard to events in Cuba, the growing outside support for communists in the labor movement, and the seemingly defensive attitudes of the Eisenhower administration and the Central American governments towards Fidel Castro. Communists, Romualdi and McClellan warned, were “reacting with new boldness and confidence” inspired by Castro’s defiant behavior towards the U.S. and they expected to topple current governments and establish “Castro-type” regimes in the area. As an extension of this analysis, Romualdi and McClellan told Kalijarvi that the growing opposition movement against Lemus was in fact a centerpiece of a Cuban conspiracy to expand communism in Central America.14

Lemus’ Crackdown on the University
Lemus’ political opening allowed the formation or reorganization of social movements and political parties, which sought democratization through civic and electoral participation. The opposition movement against Lemus, chiefly made up of the PRAM and the FNOC, comprised a wide array of social and political forces. According to Héctor Dada, “The Revolutionary Party of April and May [PRAM]…was a mixture of social democrats and radicalized liberals supported by the Communist Party.”15 Almeida writes that PRAM was formed “at the end of 1959” to participate “in the parliamentary elections in 1960” and in the presidential elections programmed for 1962. Almeida also adds that “PRAM drew its support from the university community and was animated by the recent Cuban Revolution.”16 The Frente Nacional de Orientación Cívica (FNOC) was a coalition of political parties (both legal parties such as PAR or in process of
formation like the PRAM and the PRD) and social movements. FNOC aimed at orienting “people on civic rights, and by extension and logic consequence, political [rights].”

The chronology of events that resulted in the ousting of Lemus can be summarized as follows. In June 1960, Lemus reportedly told C. Allan Stewart and Donald P. Downs, the chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador that he had uncovered a plot against his government orchestrated from Costa Rica, which involved members of the Salvadoran opposition supported by Cuba. At this time, Lemus allegedly announced Stewart and Downs his intention to crackdown on the opposition. Lemus declared PRAM illegal in July 1960, a decision that sparked widespread mobilization in San Salvador led by FNOC. To counter FNOC demonstrations, Lemus announced a weak program of social and economic reforms called “The Metalío Plan.” The Metalío plan encompassed a symbolic land redistribution program among rural families in the area of Acajutla, ostensibly to show landowners “what could be done” to deal with the “campesino problem.” In August 1960, the Salvadoran government “trucked” some twenty thousand peasants to San Salvador to show support of Lemus’ Metalío Plan. Archbishop Luis Chávez y González, the head of the Salvadoran Catholic Church, “concluded the rally with a mass.” The next day “students [affiliated to FNOC] held a rally of their own in Plaza Libertad in downtown San Salvador. They praised the Cuban revolution, attacked government repression, and strongly criticized the church for getting involved in politics. Security forces rounded up and incarcerated demonstrators.” In the subsequent days, Lemus jailed and sent to exile members of the university community including Shafik Handal and José Vides. In response, university students organized a new demonstration on August 19, 1960. Again, security forces attacked demonstrators, mostly university students, who sought refuge at the Medical School in downtown San Salvador. Security forces surrounded the Medical School throughout the night as demonstrators received food and staples from sympathizers. The following day, demonstrators left the facilities of the Medical School under the protection of the Red Cross, after Dr. Napoleón Rodríguez Ruiz, Rector of the University of El Salvador, held conversations with government officials.

Tensions between the university community and the Lemus regime grew, as Lemus accused University authorities of plotting against his government to serve foreign interests and openly threatened university autonomy. On September 1 1960, Lemus published an open letter to Rector Rodríguez Ruiz accusing the Superior University Council (SUC), the executive
government of the University, of “creating a climate of national perturbation to serve international goals.” In his letter, Lemus stated that the University was gradually becoming “a true bastion of subversion and propagation of dissolving doctrines” (i.e. Marxism) due to the work of “audacious minorities.” Lemus also lectured Rodríguez Ruiz on the responsibilities of the rectory and on those of the SUC.26

On September 2, Lemus ordered a charge against the University. Lemus’ crackdown on the university community was swift and brutal. Members of the National Police and National Guard entered the campus, beating to death Mauricio Esquivel Salguero, a university student and employee, and seriously injuring faculty, students, and workers. Rector Rodríguez Ruiz, Dr. Roberto Emilio Cuellar Milla, the Secretary General of the University and other university officials were also beaten and incarcerated. Oscar Fernández, who was barely five years old in 1960, recalled how his father, who was then a professor of law at the University of El Salvador, returned home badly wounded after the police beat him during the raid.27 Judge Ulises Salvador Alas estimated that damages of half million colones (two hundred thousand U.S. dollars) were inflicted on the university facilities during the raid. After the attack, the university closed down its activities not to reopen until after Lemus’ downfall.28

In the aftermath of the raid against the University, testimonies of the atrocities committed by the National Police and the National Guard emerged in the press.29 The General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS) organized a massive funeral for Mauricio Esquivel Salguero, the university student killed in the attack.30 María Antonieta Rodríguez Arévalo told journalists how she and her husband, José Aristides Arévalo, an official at the municipal government of San Salvador, and other women and children were brutally beaten during the raid.31 But by far the best known case of repression was the detention of Roberto Edmundo Canessa, known as “El Cherito Canessa,” Osorio’s Minister of Foreign Affairs who ran as an opposition candidate against Lemus in 1956. Canessa was beaten by members of the National Police and died as a consequence of these injuries within a few months.32 University students Roque Dalton García, Abel Salazar Rodezno, and José Luis Salcedo Gallegos were initially disappeared by Lemus’ security forces. The case of Dalton was particularly sensitive for Lemus, since Dalton was already a well-known poet and member of the PCS. Dalton, who lived in Chile during the Osorio regime, was jailed by Lemus and accused of promoting armed subversion.33 Although it is unclear if Dalton and the other individuals who appeared in a government
advertisement published in a local newspaper engaged in armed resistance; the PCS indeed formed armed groups known as the Revolutionary Action Groups (GAR) in 1959 when Lemus’ repression intensified.\(^{34}\)

The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador attempted to rally support for Lemus from the press and the Catholic Church during the last days of his regime. Roberto Dutriz, the manager of La Prensa Gráfica, visited the U.S. Embassy public affairs officer in San Salvador Robert Delaney, to express concern about the fate of his family newspaper after demonstrators apparently threw stones at the La Prensa building. According to Delaney, Dutriz showed “a sagging morale” and feared further attacks against his newspaper during the AGEUS and the CGTS demonstration planned for September 15, 1960. Delaney’s advice to Dutriz was straightforward: he should fight back against those Delaney insisted, always on calling “the communists.”\(^{35}\) Delaney also visited Archbishop Chávez y González to probe the Catholic Church’s official position on the Lemus regime. The Archbishop, who mediated between Lemus and the opposition without success, ostensibly told Delaney that the Catholic Church supported Lemus’ laws “governing public meetings and the universities” and also Lemus’ “4 points” proposal to deal with the crisis. Notwithstanding, Chávez y González, also “wondered aloud whether the Communists were this involved in Salvador (sic).” To which Delaney retorted with the standard U.S. rhetoric on the growing threat of a Cuban communist expansion in Central America. Delaney also wrote about the distancing between Chávez y González and the “rich families” that had traditionally funded the Catholic Church due to the Archbishop’s support to the recently formed Archbishopric’s Social Secretariat.\(^{36}\)

While riots spread in San Salvador, U.S. Ambassador Kalijarvi offered Lemus advice and U.S. military aid to deal with the unrest.\(^{37}\) On September 15, Independence Day in El Salvador, the insurrectionary climate rose in San Salvador as the police shot at a large demonstration, killing Rodolfo Rivas Guardado and other unidentified individuals.\(^{38}\) The next day, Ambassador Kalijarvi visited Lemus at the Presidential House. Responding to Lemus’ sense of political isolation, Kalijarvi lectured him on the high responsibilities of the Presidency. Kalijarvi reportedly told Lemus: “democracy must be defended by resort to force on occasion, and the high principles it seeks to attain can only be preserved by a readiness to defend it.” To which, Lemus allegedly responded by placing his hand on the statue of Lincoln in his office and saying: “Yes, I think of him often at this time. I realize fully that this [the willingness to defend democracy through force]
is involved.” Lemus and Kalijarvi also exchanged views on the “pattern of street fighting…and the evident importation of thugs from abroad and money supplied through Cuban channels,” purportedly shown during the previous day demonstration.39

Kalijarvi apparently did not mince words, encouraging Lemus to harden his position regarding the demonstrators. The U.S. Ambassador asked Lemus why “the student organization AGEUS had not been disbanded,” to which Lemus replied that this action would be futile since there were a number of “illegal organizations such as the PRAM and the CGTS” that were also active. Kalijarvi criticized Lemus for exiling members of the opposition, arguing that this was indeed a useless tactic. “The kind of men who were exiled [deem]… being thrown out…a mark of honor…they consider exile a further badge of honor when they returned home,” Kalijarvi told Lemus. Instead, Kalijarvi advised Lemus to create a legislation to incarcerate “agitators” “from one to ten years.” Lemus replied that Salvadoran law did not allow this kind of punishment and that only military tribunals could impose this type of sentences. This last option, both men agreed, would only further the government’s authoritarian image. Kalijarvi reported that Lemus seemed indecisive on how to handle future demonstrations. However, Lemus showed interest in learning “how to handle tear gas and techniques for the use of other means to control mobs.” Kalijarvi reported that he bluntly asked Lemus: “What do you want?” “Do you want arms?” to which Lemus supposedly responded “yes I have already asked for arms.” Kalijarvi further asked Lemus “do you want the U.S. army?” to which Lemus responded “no.”40

Rectors of the Central American universities attempted to mediate between Lemus and the University of El Salvador. In October 1960, a delegation of rectors of Central American universities headed by Dr. Carlos Tunnermann, Rector of the University of Nicaragua, arrived in San Salvador to mediate between President Lemus and the SUC.41 In this framework, Lemus offered to release members of the university community incarcerated during the September crackdown in exchange for a joint communiqué signed by Lemus and the university authorities announcing the normalization of relations between the government and the University. Rector Rodríguez Ruiz rejected Lemus’ proposal, for he believed that the government would manipulate the agreement with the University vis-à-vis public opinion. Rodríguez Ruiz told members of SUC, that the only document he was willing to sign was a unilateral declaration reiterating the apolitical nature of the University of El Salvador. In the end, members of SUC deemed negotiating with Lemus useless, for he not only failed to liberate political prisoners but he also
ordered the detention of Dr. Jorge Alberto Barriere, the General Prosecutor of the University of El Salvador, on October 16, 1960.42

Ten days later, two members of the SUC, Dr. René Fortín Magaña, a lawyer and Dr. Fabio Castillo, the vice-dean of the School of Medicine, joined military loyal to Colonel Oscar Osorio in a coup against Lemus. Fortín Magaña and Castillo promised to support the “economic autonomy” of the University while the SUC congratulated their former colleagues on becoming members of the newly formed Junta.43 The SUC publicly declared its support for the Junta, labeling it a “regime of freedom and optimism.” Lemus’ despotism, according to the SUC, threatened to erase El Salvador “from the map of civilized nations.” Lemus’ libel of combating communism at the University as the justification for the September raid obscured the nature of the confrontation between the military regime and the University, namely, the clash between “clumsiness and ignorance” and “intelligence and culture” or the “open war between the forces of right and the right of force.”44 Fortunately, in this case the forces of freedom and culture incarnated in the University of El Salvador had won the day. In this struggle, students “with their fine political sensibilities and their youthful breath assumed the vanguard role in the defense of freedom, without other arms than their civic rights facing machine guns and rifles.”45

The ousting of Lemus produced popular fervor in San Salvador. Thousands waited outside the National Penitentiary where political prisoners, including Dalton and Salazar Rodezno were freed.46 A large crowd also gathered outside the Presidential House where members of the Junta Cívico-Militar gave their first speeches. Salvadoran exiles living in Guatemala, Mexico and elsewhere were also expected to return home in the following weeks.47


Almeida considers the Junta’s fleeting existence as one of the two “mini-openings” after the rise of the military regimes in 1932 (the other one occurred in 1944 after the ousting of General Hernández Martínez).48 The Civic-Military Junta made up of three civilians and three military men loyal to Osorio took power on October 26, 1960. The Junta vowed to set conditions for holding free elections and to restore public freedoms.49 Dr. Mario Castrillo Zeledón, the new General Prosecutor, also declared his intention to promote the “demilitarization” of the National Police and the prosecution of policemen associated with Lemus’ repression.50 One of the Junta’s first official acts was to release the National Police’s secret files of those accused of “sedition and rebellion” during the Lemus regime.51
The Junta’s liberalization was welcomed by various social movements and opposition parties. FNOC expectations of the new government were high. FNOC expressed “its satisfaction for the ousting of the Prudist [PRUD] tyranny of José María Lemus” and considered the coup “a step towards the restoration of public freedoms…and the full restoration of the Constitutional order.”52 Leaders of PRAM expressed enthusiastic support for the Junta but also warned the new government about the perils of the destabilizing activities of the “reaction.”53 Catholic intellectuals took advantage of the opening created by the Junta to form the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) in November 1960. Former members of Salvadoran Catholic University Action (ACUS), then a conservative student organization, led by Abraham Rodríguez joined Roberto Lara Velado and other Catholic intellectuals to form the PDC, which would become a major player in Salvadoran politics in the following three decades.54 According to Héctor Dada, then a young Christian Democrat leader, the foundation of the PDC and its “brutally anti-oligarchic” discourse generated anxieties among a range of political actors, from the PCS and U.S. government agencies to the ultraconservative sectors of Catholic Church, and the Salvadoran oligarchy itself.55

State Department officials debated whether to grant diplomatic recognition to the Junta. While Ambassador Kalijarvi firmly opposed granting recognition to the Junta, other officials held the contrary view. Kalijarvi argued his case based on several assumptions. First, the Junta was formed by such “disparate” elements that it was doubtful that the new government could achieve stability and coherence. Moreover, there were insistent rumors about ongoing “conspiracies” and preparations for a counter coup. Second “pro-communist or communist” elements such as “the Ministers of Justice and Labor” dominated the Junta. Third, the Junta allowed the broadcasting of “Anti-American” messages on the radio and TV. Fourth, U.S. recognition would grant legitimacy to the Junta and encourage other groups in Central America to engage in similar actions against military regimes friendly to the U.S. And finally, former president Osorio, the strong man behind the coup, who was considered friendly to the U.S. government, could not control leftist members of the Junta.56 In contrast to Kalijarvi, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann deemed that the U.S. government had a better possibility of influencing political events in El Salvador by granting recognition to the Junta. According to Mann, liberals or leftists “who advocated change in the still largely semi-feudal social order in El Salvador” were often deemed communists. Mann wrote that the terms “leftist” and “communist” were often considered synonyms in El Salvador, positing that “it would be a grave mistake” to consider that the Junta was dominated
by “pro-Communist individuals” without having “substantiating evidence.” Mann alleged that the best deterrence for “pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements” in the Junta were the Osorista military (followers of former president Oscar Osorio) who were undoubtedly “pro-American.” Moreover, Mann cited Osorio who claimed to be able to control any “extreme Leftists” and “to bring unity to the coalition” behind the Junta. Despite the growing rumors of a counter coup, Mann doubted that the U.S. government’s refusal to grant recognition to the Junta would ensure a successful right-wing coup. On the contrary, he wrote that since Osorio enjoyed widespread support among the military, any such action could create a serious division among the military, weakening the strongest anti-communist institution in the country. In sum, Mann advised the Secretary of State that granting diplomatic recognition to the Junta would be the best means to deter communist influence in the new government.57

The participation of university intellectuals in the Junta was a serious concern for State Department officials. The matter of Dr. Fabio Castillo’s political affiliation, in particular, became the subject of State Department internal communications, as American and Salvadoran citizens acquainted with Castillo expressed solicited and unsolicited views about him.58 Blair Birdsall, an American engineer who supervised the construction of bridges in El Salvador in 1950, sent a memo to the State Department expressing unflattering views on Lemus and praising the clean liberal credentials of Castillo, Fortín Magaña and other members of the Junta’s cabinet, whom he either knew personally or by reference.59 Dr. Jacob Sacks of the University of Arkansas, a consultant with the OAS who worked at the University of El Salvador between April and September 1960, also dismissed previous allegations made by one Dr. Barnett that the Medical School, where Castillo was a professor, was something of a communist haven. Instead, Sacks depicted Castillo as “an intensely devoted patriot, but not chauvinistic” and a “dedicated anti-communist” unsympathetic to Fidel Castro.60

On December 14, 1960, the Junta disbanded the municipal councils and mayors associated with the Lemus regime claiming that they were elected through fraudulent means and were rejected by the local population.61 This action and the attempt to “demilitarize” the National Police, the Treasury Police, and the Fire Department apparently reinforced right-wing opposition to the Junta.62 On December 21, 1960, unidentified individuals machine gunned the residence of General Prosecutor Castrillo Zeledón, nearly killing his ten year old son Mario. Despite the attack against his house, Castrillo Zeledón vowed to continue prosecuting members
of the National Police associated with Lemus’ repression. Leaders of PRAM visited the Junta on December 20, 1960 to express their support to the Junta’s “democratic conduct.” PRAM leaders also warned the Junta that if they failed to respond “with energetic measures” to the ongoing rightist plot against the Junta, “public freedoms would be gravely threatened and the country will be in danger of returning to the painful days of the tyranny.” However the Junta did not take any assertive action to prevent a new coup.

The U.S. government delayed granting diplomatic recognition to the Junta based on the assumption that Osorio was unable to control Junta leftists who harbored sympathy toward the Cuban Revolution. Evidence of the Junta’s alleged pro-Castro leanings included a radio talk show that broadcast anti-U.S. contents, the presence of a journalist of Prensa Latina (the Cuban press agency) in San Salvador, and the Junta’s purported intention to create a popular militia. On November 11, 1960, Kalijarvi who was in Washington D.C. for consultations, argued that Osorio had lost control of the movement behind the October coup and advised the Secretary of State to further delay the recognition of the Junta. In late November 1960, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates stated that the recognition of the Junta should be decided by the Secretary of State, since it was a matter that involved mainly “political judgment.” Gates also recommended that different agencies of the U.S. government should consider “what feasibility actions can be taken to insure against a [communist] takeover” in El Salvador. In the end, the U.S. recognized the Junta in early December 1960 after several European and Latin American countries had already granted recognition to the new government. Cuba also granted official recognition to the Junta at this time.

On January 25, 1961 while members of the Junta participated in a seminar on the new electoral law, Colonels Julio Rivera and Anibal Portillo carried out a right-wing coup. Rivera and Portillo vowed to oust communists and Osoristas from government and to restore order. The Junta, according to a civilian leader of the coup, created political instability and put the country in a perilous international standing due to their close relation with the Cuban Revolution. The San Carlos garrison, located in the northern area of San Salvador became the headquarters of the coup. However, military loyal to the Junta remained in control of El Zapote garrison, near the Presidential House. A large crowd gathered outside El Zapote garrison to march towards the San Carlos garrison to protest the coup. As demonstrators walked down Avenue España, members of the National Guard shot at the march, killing scores of activists. Almeida estimates that there
were 21 fatalities as a result of this incident, but in fact the particulars of this event are relatively obscure. Activists burnt tires and buses in downtown San Salvador to protest the killings while members of the Junta who led the demonstration were captured and sent to exile.

Dada, like other witnesses of these events, maintains that the authorship of the coup was distinctly “North American.” “That [was] a coup in the logic of avoiding the Cuban influence. That coup was conducted by a gringo Colonel,” Dada said. Victor Valle tells a similar story. Fabio Castillo testified before the U.S. Congress in 1976 that “members of the U.S. Military Mission openly intensified their invitation to conspiracy and rebellion” against the Junta and that “members of the U.S. Military Mission were at the San Carlos Headquarters on the day of the coup.” For Dada it is clear that the Kennedy administration only rubberstamped the coup. “Kennedy took over on January 20 and the coup happened on January 25” recalls Dada. Dada remembered (inaccurately) that the coup coincided with the Bay of Pigs invasion. But in fact the coup followed Eisenhower’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Cuba in early January.

Political activists of the 1960s still have vivid memories of the Junta. In an interview in 2007, Dada emphatically denied that the Junta had anything to do with Cuban socialism and he described members of the Junta, whom he knew personally, as university intellectuals who attempted to modernize the country through electoral reform. Domingo Santacruz, then a FNOC activist, initially provided a blunt assessment of the Junta. “The Junta was the continuation of the political and military regime” he remembered. But when I shared my impression, based on my review of the Salvadoran press at that time, that the Junta harbored a reformist agenda, Santacruz reconsidered his argument. The Junta was not the continuation of the politico-military regime in the “conservative, reactionary character of the traditional dictatorship, so much so, that it created mistrust and malaise” among the ruling class and “that was the fundamental cause” for its downfall. Santacruz recalled that FNOC played the central role in the ousting of Lemus, it supported the Junta, but it was not represented and “had no possibilities to influence” the Junta. The Junta was indeed a reformist government isolated from the social movements that achieved few changes. “A few laws were approved,” but they were largely ineffectual. In the end, the Junta created “a little space, an opening” that allowed the mobilization of FNOC. The Directorate closed down this opening.
In roughly eighteen months, the military-oligarchic regime was revamped under U.S. tutelage to fit the “Alliance for Progress” model of governance, which featured economic modernization, industrialization, political reforms, and national security. The Civilian-Military Directorate constituted by Colonel Rivera, “another colonel, and three civilians” took over power and declared martial law in January 1960. The leaders of the coup initially invited Abraham Rodríguez to join the Directorate and offered the PDC to become the new official party; a proposal that was rejected by Rodríguez and the majority of PDC leaders. However, a conservative faction of the PDC left the party and joined former members of the PRUD (Lemus’ official party) to form the National Conciliation Party (PCN), the new official party. The Directorate called for “the election of a constitutional assembly” for December 17, 1961. Rivera resigned from the Directorate in September. In January 1962, “the Constitutional Assembly revised the 1950 constitution, gave itself the status of a national assembly, and scheduled a presidential election for April.” Not surprisingly, Rivera ran as the PCN candidate and won the presidency in an uncompetitive election. However to avoid Lemus’ fate, Rivera embarked in a series of political reforms, most notably the establishment of proportional representation in the National Assembly with the advice of Murat Williams, Kennedy’s Ambassador in El Salvador.

**Memories of the Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria (FUAR) (1961-1963)**

FUAR emerged as a PCS response to the Directorate’s repression, and its brief existence overlapped with the formation of “the Alliance for Progress” regime headed by Colonel Julio Rivera. FUAR outlined a distinct national-popular program, aimed at conducting a “democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution” whose main “task” was agrarian reform. FUAR deemed the persistence of oligarchic and feudal labor forms and increasing U.S. investment in El Salvador the two major obstacles for “national development.” FUAR’s platform maintained that the increasing “penetration of U.S. capital in El Salvador after World War II” reinforced the dependency of the Salvadoran economy on U.S. markets, creating privileged conditions for U.S. investments in El Salvador and limiting the expansion of the national industry. FUAR characterized Salvadoran elites as a mere “intermediary oligarchy” whose agro-export economy based on the super-exploitation of labor was totally dependent on the fluctuations of the U.S. market. Like Dada, Valle, and Castillo, FUAR leaders regarded the 1961 coup a product of the
U.S. However, they further read this event as the first step in the transformation of El Salvador into a “second Puerto Rico,” that is, a new “colony” of the United States. Similarly, FUAR deemed Alliance for Progress “a new method of Yankee colonization” in Latin America aimed at curtailing the growing influence of the Cuban Revolution. 

FUAR was structured in six columns that engaged in “open and secret political and social struggle” and “some military training.” FUAR columns organized in Revolutionary Action Groups (GAR), featured a number of actions such as agitation outside factories, “flash meetings” (street gatherings that lasted a few minutes), graffiti, “self defense” (e.g. armed defense of demonstrations), and “even armed propaganda” (e.g. armed militants distributing flyers). In his memoir, Victor Valle describes in precise detail high profile FUAR actions that generated “certain apprehension among the security forces.” However, for Valle, FUAR’s most emblematic action was “the attack against the American Embassy” to repudiate Rivera’s presidential inauguration held on July 1, 1962. On that occasion, “groups of demonstrators, in great numbers, organized under the explicit or latent banners of the FUAR” (i.e. activists identified with FUAR) threw bottles of green and red paint—the colors of the FUAR—against the U.S. Embassy, breaking “windows” and staining the exterior walls. According to Valle, FUAR militants initially considered throwing Molotov cocktails instead of bottles of paint and to enter the U.S. Embassy “to get files that supposedly contained personal information about Salvadoran politicians.” However, on the eve of this action, FUAR leaders instructed demonstrators “to throw bottles of green and red paint instead of Molotov cocktails.” This last minute change of heart indicated, according to Valle, the ensuing tensions between sectors of the left that favored “violent solutions” and those that opposed them.

Like their precursors, PCS intellectuals in the 1960s viewed the “peasant question” as a key problem of revolution in El Salvador. Thus the FUAR program featured a detailed analysis of the agrarian structure in the 1960s. Despite the rapid pace of industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, El Salvador remained, to a great extent, an agrarian society dominated by a small landowner class that exploited roughly 50% of the arable land (some 754 thousand hectares) and leased thousands of hectares to small or medium size producers, while some 63 thousand small landholders exploited roughly 4% of the arable land (some 67 thousand hectares). Agro-exporters relied on a seasonal labor force made up of landless peasants or small subsistence farmers who were temporarily hired by haciendas or fincas (coffee farms) during the coffee, sugar cane and
cotton harvest seasons. The precarious living conditions of these rural masses in the early 1960s remained virtually unchanged since 1932 or earlier, making agrarian reform the primary task of the Salvadoran revolution. FUAR made a priority the formation of a “peasant column,” which was led by survivors of the 1932 massacre, including Miguel Mármol, Daniel Castaneda, Modesto Ramírez, and Segundo Ramírez, the latter two “red commanders of 1932.”

In 1962 FUAR reached its greatest strength but paradoxically it also started its quick decline as PCS intellectuals split over the issue of armed struggle. Santacruz recalled Santacruz that “the development of the revolutionary political consciousness of FUAR [militants] reached its best moment in 1962.” FUAR militants often participated in “self-defense” and became increasingly radicalized as they confronted security forces or suffered imprisonment. FUAR was ready to start a “military option” in 1962 as some of its militants had basic military training. However that same year, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, a leader of the PCS since the 1940s, who returned to El Salvador in 1962 after a three-year stay in the Soviet Union, deemed FUAR a “militaristic deviation” and an expression of leftist radicalism of the PCS’ political commission. FUAR lost momentum at its clandestine “Third Plenary” held in San Salvador in 1962 due to this polemic. At that time, the organization had roughly two thousand militants organized in GARs, and it “continued growing.”

Carpio considered the creation of FUAR a crass political error of the PCS’ political commission. Carpio sought the immediate demobilization of FUAR, accusing Shafik Handal, the general coordinator of FUAR, of practicing extreme left-wing politics and adopting a “certain militaristic deviation.” Carpio maintained that the “subjective conditions” (i.e. widespread revolutionary consciousness and organization) that constitute, according to Lenin, a “revolutionary situation,” were absent in El Salvador in 1962. More to the point, Carpio deemed that the “objective conditions [vast social inequalities; socioeconomic crisis; division among ruling classes and so forth] for revolution were ripe in excess” but that “not even minimal [subjective conditions]” for revolution existed at that time. According to Santacruz, FUAR militants initially “misunderstood” Carpio’s analysis, for in fact some thought that it proved Handal’s position on FUAR correct. But Handal himself told FUAR militants that “there were discussions in the sense that perhaps [FUAR was] going too fast” in its plans to start armed revolution and that the “political situation was in fact changing.” In the end, this debate “stopped the process of radicalization of FUAR,” and the organization never engaged in military activity. Carpio’s
analysis on this matter prevailed within the PCS. Handal was removed as coordinator of FUAR and the movement itself demobilized in 1963. Moreover, Carpio also shifted the party’s focus on FUAR to the organization of the “new working class” that emerged from industrialization linked to the Central American Common Market (CACOM). The Fifth Congress of the PCS held in March 1964 ratified the PCS’ shift towards trade union politics articulated by Carpio. However, the discussion of armed struggle initiated among PCS intellectuals at the time of FUAR became a dominant theme among left intellectuals throughout the 1960s.

Conclusion

Lemus’ repression echoed the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to contain the influence of the Cuban Revolution in Central America. Although Lemus probably didn’t need a particular incentive to “combat communism” in El Salvador, it seems clear that State Department officials put extra pressure on him to crackdown on left-wing influence in trade union politics and at the University of El Salvador in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution. In this sense, Lemus’ oscillation between political opening and repression was largely informed by U.S. cold war politics in Central America.

U.S. anti-communism also sealed the fate of the Junta. The Junta’s ambiguous political composition (i.e. liberal university intellectuals and Osorista military men), its isolation from the emerging social movements and political parties, and its political miscalculations (e.g. the dismantling of Lemus’ municipal councils) clearly contributed to its quick demise. However, the Eisenhower administration’s suspicion of the Junta provided a political opening for the reactionary coup of January 1961. The State Department’s lack of willingness to grant diplomatic recognition to the Junta was apparently motivated by concern over the political affiliation of Dr. Fabio Castillo and other university intellectuals who joined the Junta, the Junta’s relative opening toward the Cuban Revolution, and the U.S. government distrust of Osorio’s capacity to control leftist or liberals in the Junta.

The events of 1960 and 1961 significantly altered the political awareness and political culture of university intellectuals in El Salvador. First, after these events, university intellectuals viewed the U.S. government as a decisive internal actor in Salvadoran politics. Unlike the crises of the military regimes of the 1940s and 1950s which were largely resolved through inter-elite
negotiations, the revamping of the military regimes, and the creation of new official parties, U.S. participation in Salvadoran affairs became ubiquitous after 1959, a situation that in turn reinforced left intellectuals’ revolutionary nationalism. Although, no conclusive evidence on the purported U.S. authorship of the coup against the Junta emerged from sources cited here, it is clear that university intellectuals shared the perception that the 1961 coup was orchestrated by the U.S. Moreover FUAR intellectuals deemed the 1961 coup the start of a new “colonization” under President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, which aimed at transforming El Salvador into a “second Puerto Rico.” Second, the confrontation between Lemus and the university community reinforced the latter’s traditional defense of university autonomy. The vigorous defense of university autonomy by SUC and AGEUS during Lemus’ repression strengthened the University of El Salvador as a center of political activity that gave impetus to the formation of opposition parties, student organizations and other social movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Third, university intellectuals renewed their efforts to create permanent opposition parties as key factors for democratization. Lemus banned PRAM in 1960, but university intellectuals strove to create a legal left party throughout the 1960s (e.g. Fabio Castillo ran as a presidential candidate of Partido de Acción Renovadora –PAR– in 1967 and PCS intellectuals revamped the Nationalist Democratic Union –UDN-). Former members of Salvadoran Catholic University Action (ACUS) along with other Social Christian intellectuals formed the PDC in 1960. PDC intellectuals articulated an anti-oligarchic discourse that gained widespread support throughout the 1960s and 1970s. They also gained increasing influence among the rural population in the 1960s, largely due to their close alliance with reformist sectors of the Catholic Church. Lastly, repression made communist intellectuals ponder armed resistance for the first time since the failed popular insurrection of 1932. Lemus’ brutal crackdown on the University, the social movements, and opposition parties as well as the massacre at Avenue España perpetrated by the National Guard during the coup against the Junta, persuaded PCS intellectuals (mostly university intellectuals) to create FUAR. Although FUAR can hardly be considered “a guerrilla organization” (as Almeida labeled it), as it never actually engaged in military activity, it did mount a militant resistance against the oligarchic-military regime, which became part of the historical memory and practical experience of the politico-military organizations in the 1970s. Moreover GAR (“The Revolutionary Action Groups” formed by the PCS during the last year of the Lemus regime) and FUAR marked the beginning of a prolonged debate over “the tactics and strategy of the revolutionary struggle in El
Salvador” among university intellectuals.98

The radicalization of university intellectuals in the 1960s was marked by the failure of their efforts to challenge oligarchic-military rule through mass mobilization, political debate, and electoral politics. Lemus’ despotism and the failed reformist experiment of the Junta which ended in the bloody coup of January 1961, under the sign of cold war politics in Central America, pointed out the beginning of a discussion on armed revolution among left university intellectuals in the 1960s. In this vein, the events of 1960 and 1961 can be seen as the starting point of the insurgent and counterinsurgent politics that characterized El Salvador in the following three decades.
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“Estudiantes Golpeados Reconocidos por el Juez.” La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960, 3 and 38.

“Manifestación de Duelo.” La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960, 3.

“Señora de Síndico Relata Atropello.” La Prensa Grafica, September 7 1960, 3.

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“Junta de Gobierno es Reconocida Por Cuba.” *La Prensa Grafica*, December 5, 1960, 3.


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“Policía y Bomberos se Desmilitarizan.” *La Prensa Grafica*, December 17, 1960, 2.


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Notes

1 Members of PRAM included social democrats, “radicalized liberals” and communists. See Joaquin Chavez, “Interview with Hector Dada.” (2007). PRAM’s name alluded the civic-military movement that ousted dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez between April and May 1944. FNOC was a center-left coalition made up of political parties and social movements. FNOC was constituted by PRAM, Partido de Acción Renovadora (PAR), Radical Democratic Party (PRD), the General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS), and the General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CGTS). See Víctor Valle, Siembra De Vientos El Salvador 1960-69 (San Salvador: CINAS, 1993), 42-47.


5 In order to address these questions I rely on my reading of the declassified documents of the State Department’ Office for Central American and Panamanian Affairs (1958-1961), transcripts of the meetings of the Supreme University Council (CSU), the executive government of the University of El Salvador, the coverage of the Salvadoran Press between 1960 and 1961, Victor Valle’s memoir (who was then a University student) and interviews with Domingo Santacruz, Héctor Dada Ireci and Abraham Rodríguez, three opposition leaders who witnessed these events.

6 I draw on William Sewell’s reflections on the impact of events in the transformation of structures in order to analyze these events. Sewell writes that “lumpiness, rather than smoothness, is the normal texture of historical temporality. These moments of accelerated change, I would argue, are initiated and carried forward by historical events.” An historical event, according to Sewell “is (1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structures.” “Events are literally significant, they signify something new and surprising. They introduce new conceptions of what really exists…of what is good…and of what is possible” wrote Sewell. In other words, events impact the transformation of structures (i.e. economic formations, political systems and culture) in part because actors give a particular significance to events.


8 Five State Department officials identified as Buchanan, Hall, Murphy, Olson and Lightner signed a “Position Paper” regarding Lemus state visit. See “State Visit by Salvadoran President Lemus March 10-20 1959, Position Paper Communist Activities in El Salvador,” ed. State Department (Declassified Documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs U.S. National Archives, 1959).

9 “Between 1959 and 1960, the military regime continuously harassed the CGTS while boosting the expansion of the CGS. The security forces persecuted the fledgling leftist labor confederation [the CGTS] by jailing members, as well as raiding and closing down its headquarters on several occasions – all in reaction to the confederation’s open denunciations of the military-controlled government. The CGTS also served as a key
coalition member along with AGEUS, PRAM…, Fraternity of Salvadoran Women, and Frentes Magisteriales (teachers’ organizations) in the civic movement leading to the overthrow of Colonel Lemus in the fall of 1960.” See Almeida, 59.

10 See “State Visit by Salvadoran President Lemus March 10-20 1959, Position Paper Communist Activities in El Salvador.”

11 Ibid. Also see “University of El Salvador Elections - the Weber Case Memorandum from C. Allan Stewart to Mr. Rubottom,” ed. State Department (Declassified Documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs U.S. National Archives, March 4, 1959).

12 See “University of El Salvador Elections - the Weber Case Memorandum from C. Allan Stewart to Mr. Rubottom.” “State Visit by Salvadoran President Lemus March 10-20 1959, Position Paper Communist Activities in El Salvador.”


14 See Chavez, “Interview with Héctor Dada.”

15 See Almeida, 61.


17 Lemus reportedly told Stewart and Downs that “he had been patient,” tried to conduct “a democratic government” and avert repression but “that the limits have now been reached and that the time for action had arrived.” Lemus also told Stewart and Downs about the increasing “communist” influence at the University, the trade unions and among the press. See “Memorandum of Conversation- Present: Lt. Col. Jose Maria Lemus President of El Salvador, C. Allan Stewart, Director Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, State Department, and Donald P. Downs, Chargé d’affairs, U.S. Embassy in El Salvador.” ed. State Department: Declassified Documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, U.S. National Archives, June 7, 1960.

18 See Almeida, 61.


20 See “Memorandum of Conversation- Present: Lt. Col. José María Lemus President of El Salvador, C. Allan Stewart, Director Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, State Department, and Donald P. Downs, Chargé d’affairs, U.S. Embassy in El Salvador.”

21 See Montgomery, 48-49.

22 Shafik Handal, a member of the PCS, became the coordinator of the Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria (FUAR), a militant organization formed in March 1961. Handal later became a prominent figure in the history of the Latin American left.


26 See “Carta Del Presidente Lemus Al Rector de La Universidad de El Salvador,” (La Prensa Grafica, September 1 1960).


28 Judge Alas, who personally inspected the campus, stated that “phones, furniture, academic titles…blackboards, file cabinets… professional documents and didactic material” were destroyed during the raid. Judge Alas reported that the police and the National Guard damaged “aisles, rooms, the offices of the Rectory,
classrooms, bathrooms, warehouses” as they perforated “big holes” in the walls in order to capture people who took refuge in those places. “Files, money and many other objects of the University and of employees” also disappeared during the charge. Judge Alas and the forensic experts who accompanied him showed particular indignation at the destruction of the portrait of Salvadoran cultural icon Francisco Gavidia. See “500 Mil Cols. En Daño a La Universidad,” La Prensa Grafica, September 7 1960.

29 René Angulo Urbina, a student of economics at the National University suffered cranial fractures, as well as “blows in the face and in other parts of the body.” Forensic experts performed “medical-legal” exams to Teodoro Abel Moreno Guillén, Elda Lucila Guirola, Orlando López Peña, Roberto Góchez Hill, Rodolfo Ramírez Amaya, Vicente Argüeta Escobar, Lotario Bayardo Gomez, Bonifacio García and numerous other victims of the raid who received medical treatment “at various medical centers of the capital.” See “En El Hospital,” La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960, “Estudiantes Golpeados Reconocidos Por El Juez,” La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960.


31 See “Manifestación de Duelo,” La Prensa Grafica, September 6 1960. María Antonieta Rodríguez Arévalo told the press: “My husband is seriously ill. He has around thirty cranial fractures and other blows that have been diagnosed after he was freed. I, similarly, -showing her arms, legs and back- was also mercilessly beaten like many other ladies and eight students of a school located near the National University.” See “Señora de Síndico Relata Atropello,” La Prensa Grafica, September 7 1960.


33 Salvador Cayetano Carpio, then a member of the political commission of the PCS recalled the formation of the GAR as follows:

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34 Salvador Cayetano Carpio, then a member of the political commission of the PCS recalled the formation of the GAR as follows:

In nineteen fifty nine there was in our country a very important situation, namely the struggle against Lemus. The army entered the university amidst the booming of the mass movement. Shafik Handal, Raúl Castellanos Figueroa and various other members of the political commission of the Communist Party were sent to exile. The Communist Party was sensitive to the moment. We started using (sic) action groups of four or five comrades to learn the use of arms. This was the origin of the Revolutionary Action Groups (GAR). We called for insurrection, but we did not achieve this objective because the movement was too young, but that in itself implied a shift: to unleash certain forms of armed struggle to oust a government.


35 Demonstrators apparently stoned the facilities of La Prensa Grafica during a protest in August 1960, the next day editorial of La Prensa exhorted Lemus to take strong action against demonstrators. In reference to this incident, Delaney wrote “He [Dutriz] then launched into a lament admitting first that the papers’ editorial policy had caused an economic boycott which had hurt, and second that the change in policy noticed last week had alienated the government. The paper felt alone, without protection, he said.” According to Delaney,
Communists considered “La Prensa,” the [Catholic] Church and the State, “the three institutions…they had to discredit and destroy before anarchy and a Communist thrust for final power (sic) could be assured. Thus Prensa (sic) had to stand firm in support of the State. They could not compromise; it would only bring more misery down on them. They simply had to fight.” See “Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: Roberto Dutriz, Business Manager, La Prensa Gráfica and Robert F. Delaney, Public Affairs Officer U.S. Embassy in El Salvador,” ed. State Department (Declassified Documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, U.S. National Archives, September 13, 1960).


38 See “Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: H.E. President José María Lemus Ambassador Thorsten V. Kalijarvi.”

39 “We agreed that the technique of disturbances and fighting that was followed yesterday was too sophisticated to have been devised in El Salvador. Police had picked up disturbers from Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The President said that when a Costa Rican roughneck was interrogated, he spoke about the terrible hatred that existed in Costa Rica for El Salvador. All kinds of provocation was (sic) spread in all directions” wrote Kalijarvi. See “Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: H.E. President José María Lemus Ambassador Thorsten V. Kalijarvi.”

40 See “Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: H.E. President José María Lemus Ambassador Thorsten V. Kalijarvi.”


43 The term “economic autonomy” refers to the allocation of an adequate budget to the University in the national budget. See SUC, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme University Council, October 28, 1960,” (Archives of the University of El Salvador, 1960).


45 Ibid.

46 Outside the penitentiary, an exhausted Dalton told the press: “I did not receive physical tortures, only moral [tortures], when I was slandered for something I did not commit…the exit from the Central Penitentiary was an unexpected moment to me and my partners. I was lying on the floor of one of the cells and it has been a great surprise. I felt very sick, because they treat us like dogs: the meals we received daily consisted of two hard tortillas and sour beans…” Abel Salazar Rodezno told the press a similar story: “I have lost 32 pounds as a consequence of all the sufferings I experienced at the National Police and the Penitentiary. At the police I was subject to constant interrogation. At the penitentiary, along with other political prisoners, I was held at the famous cell number 9 destined to hardened criminals.” See “Recobran Su Libertad Los Detenidos Políticos,” *La Prensa Gráfica*, October 27 1960. Italo López Valleceillos, a prominent scholar was also among Lemus’ political prisoners. “Ex-Detenido se Refiere a las Burlas a la Justicia,” *La Prensa Gráfica* October 28, 1960.

See Almeida,9

See “Junta de Gobierno Expone su Ideología,” La Prensa Grafica November 1, 1960.


Rodríguez, Lara Velado, Guillermo Manuel Ungo and others decided to form the PDC as a result of their reflections on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church during retreats at the San José de La Montaña Seminary. Rodríguez, Ungo and other founders of the PDC had been active in university politics since the 1950s. Rodriguez, the cofounder of ACUS in 1949 was a reformist Catholic who opposed communist influence at the National University. Lara Velado on the other hand, was the leader of a well-established group of professionals who sought to articulate a non-communist alternative to military rule. Abraham Rodríguez recalled that the founders of the PDC envisioned the formation of a permanent and autonomous opposition party. Although legal opposition parties such as the Partido de Acción Renovadora (PAR) existed in 1960; they were only active during elections and virtually ineffectual to challenge the official party. Founders of the PDC, according to Rodríguez, were eager to change this historical pattern, creating a well-thought political alternative, sustained by the Catholic Church social doctrine, the pastoral letters of Monsignor Chávez y González, the Archbishop of San Salvador, and a continuous activism they were determined to sustain. See Joaquín Chávez, “Interview with Abraham Rodríguez,” (2006). Valle labelled Ungo, the President of ACUS in the late 1950s a “center-right Catholic.” Valle, Siembra De Vientos El Salvador 1960-69, 51.

According to Dada, “the PDC was born on November 24, 1960…At that time the CP accused us of being CIA agents. [Conversely] the CIA feared political instability and the idea of withdrawing the army from politics and of not having an official party… [The fact that the PDC] adopted the pastoral letters of Monsignor Chávez as [its] ideological base, generated mistrust within the Church itself because Monsignor Chávez rejected a partisan commitment, and among the oligarchy. See Chávez, “Interview with Héctor Dada.”

State Department preoccupations about Dr. Castillo’s alleged anti-US activities at the School of Medicine were not new. Dr. José Kuri, the head of the School of Medicine visited Ambassador Kalijarvi on September 29, 1959 to assure him that the School of Medicine did not engage in anti-US activities and to provide an unsolicited defence of Dr. Castillo. Kuri told Kalijarvi that Castillo was the leading advocate in adopting “U.S.
teaching methods and technical procedures” at the School of Medicine, and that Castillo also tried to persuade his colleagues that “the U.S. [educational] system was superior.” Commenting on Kuri’s defence of Castillo, Ambassador Kalijarvi wrote: “as Dr. Castillo’s name had not been mentioned, Kuri’s spirited defence of him was, in a way, an admission on his part that Castillo needs defending, that there are valid grounds for believing that he is the source of much of the present difficulties and that this is weighing on Dr. Kuri’s conscience.” See “Memorandum of Conversation - Participants: Ambassador Kalijarvi, Mr. Donald P. Downs, Dr. Kuri Dean of Medical School, Dr. DeSola Assistant Dean, Dr. Byers,” ed. State Department (Declassified documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs U.S. National Archives, September 29, 1959).

Birdsall wrote: “[Castillo is] a quiet unassuming professional man. He is extremely conscientious and all of his zeal has been brought to bear on a desire to improve the quality of medical education in El Salvador. In a few years, he accomplished a great deal in this direction. To the best of my knowledge, it was his capability, his singleness of purpose which persuaded some of the large educational foundations here (I believe Guggenheim and Kellogg but am not sure) to donate funds to a new laboratory equipment. I believe it was this same equipment which was subject to the greatest damage during the recent riots. I had no direct word during the period, but can well imagine that this quiet young doctor became so desperate when he saw his life’s work crumble around him, that he decided to risk his life in an attempt to do something about it.” Birdsall categorized the Lemus regime as a typical Latin American dictatorship, “giving lip-service only to democracy (sic) supported by the ruling families who have an interest in maintaining the feudal character of society.” Birdsall also wrote: “the cancer that is Fidel Castro has infected and inflamed the minds of much of the youth of Latin America, manifested recently in El Salvador by student riots which resulted in at least temporary closure of the National University and the establishment of a form of martial law.” Ultimately the “drastic measures” taken by the Lemus government to counter the unrest, created the conditions for the bloodless coup in which Castillo, Fortín Magaña and others were involved. See Blair Birdsall, “Memo on the New Government in El Salvador Central America,” ed. Department of State (Washington D.C.: Declassified documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs U.S. National Archives, November 11 1960).

In a conversation with State Department officials, Dr. Sacks pointed out that there were no basis to assume that the “top personnel of the Medical School” were “anti-American or pro-communists.” “If Castillo was sometimes difficult to deal with, it is out of his intense idealism rather than stubbornness,” Sacks told State Department officials. Moreover, Sacks told the State Department that student activists had chosen the Medical School as a place “to hold their rally [against Lemus] because of geographical reasons, not because left-wing student political leaders were among the medical students.” Sacks depicted Castillo as “a dedicated anti-communist… [who] looks for Castro’s political demise within a year because of the anti-democratic actions he has taken since assuming power.” See “Memorandum of Conversation - Subject: Communist Influence in Medical School in El Salvador- Participants: Dr. Jacob Sacks, University of Arkansas, Mrs. Katherine W. Bracken, Director, Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs; Mr. Maxwell Chaplin, Office in Charge, Honduran Affairs,” ed. State Department (Declassified Documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, U.S. National Archives, December 27, 1960).


See “Boletín de Prensa del PRAM.”

See “Memorandum to the Acting Secretary from Mr. Mann - Subject: Recent Development in El Salvador,” ed. State Department (Declassified Documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, U.S. National Archives, November 5, 1960).
The Ambassador’s views were largely based on a letter he received from Donald P. Downs, an officer at the U.S. embassy in San Salvador, who deemed that the anti-American inclinations of members of the Junta became crystal-clear in their recent public attacks against the U.S. government and the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. Downs concluded that Osorio had been “doubled crossed,” and that consequently it would be “a very grave error to put our money on Mr. Osorio.” See “Donald P. Downs Letter to Ambassador Thorsten Kalijarvi,” ed. State Department (Declassified documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs U.S. National Archives, November 10, 1960). Kalijarvi quoted Downs in this letter to the Secretary of State. See “Thorsten V. Kalijarvi to the Secretary- Further Delay in U.S. Recognition of Junta Government of El Salvador,” ed. State Department (Declassified documents of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs U.S. National Archives, November 11, 1960).


José Francisco Valiente, a member of the Directorate told U.S. journalists who arrived in San Salvador the day of the coup that there were “definitive proofs” of Fidel Castro’s support to “philo-communists” in El Salvador, namely, the massive amounts of propaganda that Salvadorans travelling to Cuba brought back to the country and the presence of communist in the Junta. See “Elecciones Libres Promete Directorio,” La Prensa Grafica January 28, 1961.

See Almeida, 61.

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It was evident and it was perceived with certain clarity, how a vehicle of the north American military mission travelled between El Zapote and the San Carlos, the garrisons at odds, like mediating the situation. It was evident how the golpistas, consciously and in terms of vision yield to the north American position of the Alliance for Progress, which then became a program of more or less large scope. See Valle, Siembra De Vientos El Salvador 1960-69.

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See Montgomery,52-53.

See Chávez, “Interview with Héctor Dada.”

Dada summarized the political endgame of the Junta as follows: [The Junta] “should not be interpreted as a socialist attempt, because neither Ricardo Falla, nor René Fortín [Magaña] had ever been socialists. And Fabio Castillo, at that time was not a socialist, nor was he a socialist when he was the rector of the university [between 1963 and 1967]. It should be remembered that the law for the university reform was supported by [U.S.] AID. But [the Junta] was an attempt to modernize the country. Another thing is that there were no organized political parties and that they rejected the creation of an official party or to take care of the PRUD, because their program was the electoral modernization of the country. There [was] only one party that supported them, the Revolutionary Party of April and May [PRAM]. [The Junta] gave the impression of being a left government but as Ricardo Falla used to say until the hour of his death: “When have I being a leftist?” See Chávez, “Interview with Héctor Dada.”

“Osorio and those who surrounded him [attempted to create a] reformist government [but] one thing is to want it, declare it and think about it and another is to do it. They had the intention, but they couldn’t do it. They didn’t have time to do it and they couldn’t do it. Why? Because what they were really doing was holding the rock, nothing more. They didn’t have the capacity, they didn’t accept popular support. We [members of FNOC] took over the streets, we went and supported them. We were there at the Presidential House immediately after [the coup].” Ibid.

Dada considered the Directorate “the ideal Alliance for Progress regime,” in that it combined an “intensely modernizing platform but before anything else, national security.” Furthermore Dada recalls that the Rivera regime which followed the Directorate implemented “a policy of reform of agrarian property, of defense of the interests of workers, in short, Alliance for Progress.” See Chavez, “Interview with Hector Dada.” Santacruz deemed the Directorate’s Constitutional reform (January 1962) and Rivera’s decision to open the electoral process to the opposition parties and to establish a new system of proportional representation at the National Assembly a maneuver aimed at countering the influence of the Cuban Revolution through a limited political opening. However Santacruz maintains that Rivera closed down alternatives for the much needed internal reforms and solely focused on the creation of the Central American Common Market, hoping that it would stimulate employment and the growth of an internal market as an alternative to the impending social crisis. See Chávez, “Interview with Domingo Santacruz.”

Members of the Directorate were Colonel Julio Rivera, Colonel Aníbal Portillo, Major Rodríguez Simó and two civilians Dr. Antonio Rodríguez Port and Dr. José Francisco Valiente. See “Directorio Asume Poder en El País- Fue Establecida La Ley Marcial,” La Prensa Gráfica January 26, 1960.

According to Abraham Rodríguez, PDC leaders rejected the military’s proposal to become the new official party because they disagreed with the practice of forming new official parties after the coups and were firm on the idea of forming a “permanent opposition parties” as a precondition to democratization. “I was the first civilian called when the government was organized at the San Carlos [garrison],” recalled Abraham Rodríguez. “They [military leaders of the coup] asked me to join the Directorate but we [the founders of the PDC] wanted permanent political parties, to break with [the practice] of forming parties after the coups, [to form] parties as institutions of a democratic system.” “I suggested them [to appoint] Dr. [Antonio] Rodríguez Port and Dr. Valiente but we did not take part [in the Directory].” The military “asked us [the Christian Democrats] to become the official party…during hours we discussed at the house of [José Napoleón] Duarte” and decided that “it was not convenient [to accept the offer] because the country needed “permanent parties” in order to achieve democratization. But despite the official PDC position to endorse the rightist coup, a conservative faction of the PDC led by Italo Giammatei left the party to form the new official party, the Party of National Conciliation (PCN). Giammatei reportedly told Rodríguez, Duarte and the rest of founders of the PDC that they were “naïve children” for rejecting the military’s proposal to become the new official party. See Chávez, “Interview with Abraham Rodríguez.” Based on her interviews with Ruben Zamora, a member of the PDC until 1980 and Hugo Carrillo, the Secretary General of the PCN in the late 1980s, Montgomery confirms this version but clarifies that the conservative Christian Democrats join old members of the PRUD, Lemus’ official party, to form the PCN. See Montgomery,53. Also see footnote 5 in Chapter 2.
that followed the Directorate] and the one that Julio Rivera attempts to led) are, in contrast, manufactured by U.S. Imperialism, are directly to its service and only served secondarily the interest of the oligarchy. Is precisely this change in the control of the power of the State that proves that we are being victims of an accelerated process of colonization that will transform us, if we don’t stop it, into the second “Free Associate State” of the United States, in the second Puerto Rico.” Ibid.

86 “CGTS members constituted FUAR’s workers column; members of Fraternidad Magisterial the teacher’s column; members of PRAM “the May 9 Column;” members of AGEUS the university students’ column; members of Fraternidad de Mujeres Salvadoreñas the women’s column; and Miguel Mármol, Daniel Castaneda, Modesto Ramirez and Segundo Ramirez, all of them survivors of 1932 massacre, organized the peasants’ column. Lastly, members of the short-lived “Revolutionary Movement April 2” known as “MR 2-4” led by Santacruz, which emerged independently from the PCS, also joined the FUAR.” See Chavez, “Interview with Domingo Santacruz.”

87 Ibid.

88 “During the inauguration of a Central American soccer tournament…at the Flor Blanca Stadium…a group of FUAR militants [entered the stadium] with a meter and half letters rolled to their bodies, lined up in an orderly fashion in the popular section of the stadium [known as “sun section”]and at the culminating moment of the [official] ceremony they unfolded the letters that were the size of a person and it looked very good from the [opposite] section of the stadium [the letters apparently spell out “FUAR Welcomes You”]. It was a small propaganda action, amusing, but audacious. That is way I tell you, the FUAR was an organization that at least did audacious things.” Valle, Siembra De Vientos El Salvador 1960-69, 62-63.

89 Ibid., 60-61.


91 According to FUAR, the agro-export economy relied mostly on the labor of landless peasants or small subsistence farmers who were temporary hired by haciendas and fincas during the harvesting of coffee, sugar cane, and cotton. Landless peasants and small subsistence farmers made up a population of roughly 1.5 million that lived in extreme poverty deprived of the most basic public services. In short, FUAR intellectuals believed that the socio-economic conditions of Salvadoran peasants in the 1960s were not substantially different from those existing in the 1930s. See FUAR, “Proyecto Plataforma Programática del FUAR.”


93 Carpio spent three years (1959-1962) in the Soviet Union studying Marxism-Leninism. See Chávez, “Interview with Domingo Santacruz.” It is unclear if Carpio’s views on the FUAR were the product of a personal analysis or in fact an expression of the Soviet doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” with the U.S. The Soviet Union generally opposed the formation of armed revolutionary movements in Latin America in the 1960s. Smith and others have often remarked that Soviet policy in Latin America was, generally speaking, “neither adventurerist nor confrontational” (except between 1928 and 1935, and “perhaps during a few weeks in the fall of 1962”). See for instance, Wayne Smith, “The End of World Revolution in Latin America,” in The Russians Aren’t Coming: New Soviet Policy in Latin America, ed. Wayne Smith (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 37.

94 FUAR leaders considered the formation of the “feminine column” a great success. “The women’s column developed an interesting organizational work among women, that is, combative struggle of women.” FUAR also engaged the formation of a “peasant column” led by Miguel Mármol, Daniel Castaneda, Modesto Ramírez, and Segundo Ramírez, the latter two “red commanders of 1932.” However, “since 62 the FUAR was undermined by that internal discussion [over armed struggle]… the process of radicalization of the
FUAR stopped and consequently [the possibility] to give the step toward the military aspect, because Shafik [Handal] himself said that there was a discussion in the sense that apparently we were going to fast, that the political conditions were changing and it was true.” Chavez, “Interview with Domingo Santacruz.” Santacruz version on the demobilization of FUAR matches but it is more nuanced than the version on the demobilization of FUAR that the leaders of the Popular Liberation Forces –FPL Farabundo Marti- told Marta Harnecker in the early 1990s. See Harnecker, Con La Mirada En Alto: Historia De Las Fuerzas Populares De Liberación Farabundo Martí a Través de Entrevistas con sus Dirigentes.

95 “[Carpio criticized] Shafik [Handal] and other members of the leadership, but particularly Shafik of having fallen in the infantile sickness of communism, not only that, but also of certain militaristic deviation…of educating the militancy of the FUAR in the idea that revolution was around the corner and that therefore the problem of power was right there and that…it was necessary to work for it. In [Carpio’s] judgment that was a grave error, a serious ideological deviation and [he thought] that it was necessary to review that.” See Chávez, “Interview with Domingo Santacruz.”

96 Ibid.

97 This notion is similar to Wickham-Crowley’s depiction of Latin American universities as “political enclaves” during the 1960s. See Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 35.

98 Menjívar observed that this debate also impacted trade union politics in the 1960s. See Rafael Menjívar, Formación y Lucha del Proletariado Industrial Salvadoreño (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1979), 94.