

IX.
METAFÍSICA Y TEODICEA

Ansgar Lyssy

The Concept of *Oeconomia* in Leibniz's Philosophy

Resumen: *En este ensayo proporciono un corto esquema del significado de la noción teológica "economía" en la filosofía de Leibniz. Distingo diferentes usos del término: la economía de las cosas tal como está establecida en la creación; la economía de la gracia, que corresponde a las virtudes de los humanos; y la economía política, que refleja la divina.*

Palabras clave: *Economía. Teología. Metafísica. Dios.*

Abstract: *In this essay, I provide a brief sketch of the meaning of the theological notion "economy" in Leibniz's philosophy. I distinguish different uses of the term: the economy of things as established in creation; the economy of grace, corresponding to the virtues of humans; and the political economy, which mirrors the divine economy.*

Key words: *Economy. Theology. Metaphysics. Creation. God.*

1. Introduction

Recently, some major studies have shed new light on the significance of the concept *oikonomia* in western thought, particularly before it became the modern concept of *economy*. First and foremost, Agamben (2011) investigates the different transformations of the word *oikonomia* in the patristic period, using a historical and lexicographical study of several theological authors from the first centuries to make a point

about the theological origins of modern political and economical concepts. A lengthier and more detailed study similar to Agamben's but without the political intentions may be found in Richter (2005), which is also a comprehensive study of the different uses and transformations of the concept of *oikonomia*. Groh (2010) sketches the origin of modern science within a specific context of theology and the understanding of the world as *creation*. Though the divine economy of the world is a major theme within the book, it lacks a discussion or analysis of the *concept* of economy.

All these authors however make it unmistakably clear that the early modern concept of economy is fundamentally theological in nature, even though it stretches over different areas of thought and has different meanings depending on the context. 'Economy' was conceived of as science, while 'political economy' would be a *modus operandi* within politics. 'Animal economy' is the specific structure of organisms, while one would also understand the principle of parsimony as a kind of economy of thought, that is, rationality governed by principles of effectiveness.

However, a large and almost forgotten complex process of transformation still looms behind these modern diffusions of the concept of economy. It originally derived from the greek concept of household planning, but became a theologoumenon of great importance in the patristic literature and a central concept of stoic philosophy of nature. Agamben argues that even though the *meaning* of the term has shifted, its *sense* has not changed in the same way and that the modern concepts of government and power still derive from *oikonomia* as a theologoumenon.

This theological debate is significant for philosophers as well, because it sheds some light on the relation between our understanding of the world itself and the distribution of goods within it.

Unfortunately, none of the above mentioned authors deals extensively with Leibniz, and it seems that the very concept of *oikonomia* / *oeconomia* / *economy* in Leibniz's thought has been ignored by many Leibniz scholars¹. The only exceptions I'm aware of is Beeley (1996) on the one hand, who dedicates one chapter of his book on Leibniz's early natural philosophy to his concept of *oikonomia* in the early writings, especially in the *Hypothesis physica nova*. Smith (2011) on the other hand has devoted an entire chapter of his recent book on divine machines to the concept of 'animal economy', the very specific structure of living beings.

But a more general explanation of the meaning, the role or the specificity of the concept of *oeconomia* within Leibniz's philosophy is still missing. The closest we get is another brief, but powerful statement by Philip Beeley:

„Often the use of science is couched in terms of harmony or divine benevolence: the benevolence of a geometricising God who has arranged things in such a way that the many are governed by the few. The counterpart of harmony is economy just as the counterpart of diversity is unity.“
(Beeley, 1999, p. 142)

This is a helpful start, but not the end of an enquiry, since Beeley does not tell us what *economy* means within Leibniz's philosophy.

To be fair, Leibniz doesn't use the latin word *oeconomia* very frequently and I did not find a single passage where he uses the greek term *oikonomia*. Together with the latin translation as *dispensatio*, we find only some dozen usages of both terms. But the frequency of usage does not indicate in any way the importance of a concept for Leibniz, as can easily be illustrated by the much discussed 'fulguratio' and 'existiturire'.

Philip Beeley offers the opinion that the concept of economy is of „central significance“ for Leibniz (Beeley, 1996, p. 212); Ursula Goldenbaum in turn states that “divine economy”

is a “central concept” in Leibniz (Goldenbaum, 1999, p. 100), but she similarly doesn't offer any reason why or how it is to be understood. In this sense, it is the aim of this essay, to provide some tentative and preliminary explanation of the role of the concept “*oeconomia*” in Leibniz's thought.

As is well known, *oikonomia* is composed of the greek words *oikos* and *nomos* and is literally translated as *household-management* or *household-planning*. Thus, in its origin, the concept of *oikonomia* is directly opposed to the concept of politics, which denotes the *management* or *planning* of the *polis*. The difference is that the household is led by only one person (*despotes*) and is considered to be a *monarchia*, whereas the polis is governed by many.

This original meaning changed significantly, however, within a specific Christian context. In theological writings, it usually refers to God's providential management of the universe, the divine saving purposes effected through incarnation, and even the divine self-disposition into Trinity. It is important to note that economy is generally considered to be *an activity* and thus to be distinguished from the essence or being of God¹. With the concept of a divine economy, action and personality are introduced into the abstract concept of God, making him the 'household-manager' of the world in a sense in which neither the *demiurgos* of Plato, nor the aristotelian concept of an unmoved mover can be conceived.

As Agamben points out, it is with Paul's theology, that the concept of *oikonomia* is introduced into a theological discourse, signifying the task that God has assigned to Paul. In this context, economy is not to be understood as a 'plan of salvation', as 'Heilsgeschehen', but rather as a task or an activity². According to 1. Corinthians 4.1, the believer is obliged to fulfill the divine task by a bond of trust, while the divine plan remains hidden: “Let a man account of us, as servants of Christ, and treasurers [oikonomous] of the mysteries of God. Here, moreover, it is required in *oikonomoi*, that a man be found faithful.”³

The greek word 'oikonomia' was translated into latin as 'oeconomia' as well as 'dispensatio'⁴. Agamben argues, that it can also be translated as 'dispositio', but I have not found any passage in Leibniz's writings where 'dispositio' could be

clearly understood as a translation of 'oikonomia'. As a general term, 'oeconomia' preserves its core sense of an ordered activity, directed at a purpose. Thus it should be noted, that "oeconomia" is not an economic term, but a term used in very different political, (proto-)biological and ontotheological contexts.

Unfortunately, there are very few passages in Leibniz's writings where he relates his concept of *oeconomia* to one of his many sources⁵ and he never does so in a clear way. I will therefore not discuss the specific tradition in which he stands or sees himself.

2. *Oeconomia* as a topic in Leibniz's philosophy

In a preliminary way, we can distinguish three different contexts, in which Leibniz speaks of *oeconomia*. First and foremost, he conceives of an *oeconomia mundi*, *oeconomia rerum*, or *oeconomia operis*. This is construed as a kind of economy of the physical world as a creation of God. The concept of an *oeconomia* or *dispensatio gratiae* seems to be related. These terms seem to appear exclusively in the debates about divine providence and I'll try to elaborate on their relation.

Second and quite unsurprisingly, he speaks of a political economy, which means the distribution of goods by the will of a human sovereign. On occasion, Leibniz also speaks of an *oeconomia ecclesiae*⁶, which similarly seems to denote the government of the church in analogy to the household.

The third use is the *oeconomia animalis* or *oeconomia corporis*, which refers to the structure of the individual body⁷. This concept is basically a precursor of the modern term 'physiology'.

In this essay, I'll mostly discuss the first and only briefly the second meaning. In case of *oeconomia animalis*, I refer to Justin Smith's detailed account of the concept.

To my knowledge, there is only one passage from which we could glean an explanation of the theological meaning of the term *oeconomia*, or of the *oeconomia gratiae*. In this quote it is explicitly understood as the normative law established by

Christ, directed at salvation: "[...] the *oeconomia* was not explicit in the old testament: [...] The law of Christ is normative [aimed] at salvation."⁸ Unfortunately, it is not clear, whether this idea can be considered as Leibniz's own opinion or just as an excerpt of another text he read⁹, but this will fit quite well with the following attempts to analyze some of the appearances and uses of the term *oeconomia* in Leibniz's writings.

Leibniz's own conception of the differing uses of *oeconomia* as science or areas of knowledge differs a little bit from this distinction. A table on the order of library books is exemplary of Leibniz's idea of the systematic structure of knowledge according to its content and methodology. There he distinguishes three types of economy, though he does not relate them with each other¹⁰:

- "Principle of nomothesis, or politics and economies applied at laws";
- "economy of private use";
- "physical economy".

But this distinction concerns different areas of knowledge, while knowledge of the divine economy or *oeconomia rerum* probably would belong to the theology of divine providence. It is therefore unadvisable to transfer this distinction, which is valid only within the context of explicitly human knowledge, to the way Leibniz uses the term within his writings.

3. *The economy of things*

Leibniz's concept of an economy of things did change notably during his career. In the early *Hypothesis Physica Nova*, the concept of economy plays a significant role. The term is used to denote the equilibrium of nature, established by a wise creator, maintained by an optimization of physical entities (e. g. gravity, aether) and their self-stabilizing relation¹¹. The world itself is balanced and there is no unnecessary entity or dominance by some entities over others.

According to the wisdom of the creator, a lot of things are made possible by very few

principles¹². In this early account, Leibniz only mentions the divine wisdom, but does not refer to the divine justice yet. This will play a more significant role in his later writings. We should understand this early idea of an *oeconomia rerum* as the rational structure of the world, without the moral and teleological dimensions which it attains in later writings. It seems that the principle of parsimony (*entia non esse multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*) serves as the model of rationality and as the regulative principle for the world. It is not until later years that Leibniz realizes that the principle of sufficient reason entails the principle of the best and thus also the economy of things and perfections. It is important to note here, that perfections are not to be understood as merely mathematical, but also as moral properties.

Fifteen years later, Leibniz begins the second paragraph of his *Discourse on Metaphysics* with the question of the concept of God in order to discuss the immediate connection between justice and wisdom. After the confrontation with Spinoza in 1676, Leibniz became acutely aware of the fact that the idea of a God without free will leads to fatalism and determinism. Only henceforth does he distinguish between absolute necessity, which determines the form of thought, and moral necessity, which determines the content of God's will. Consequently, Leibniz emphasizes that the reign of the divine, the City of God, is not to be conceived as an immoral tyranny or despotism¹³. This leads him to abandon the idea of a geometricising God:

„If mechanical laws depended upon geometry alone without metaphysics, phenomena would be entirely different. Now since the wisdom of God has always been recognized in the detail of the mechanical structure of certain particular bodies, it must also be shown in the general economy of the world and in the constitution of the laws of nature.“¹⁴

It is the economy of things which establishes the connection between the divine wisdom and the phenomena because this leads to a 'balanced' account of physical goods and natural laws *in relation to the happiness of the spirits*:

„Of what the rules of the perfection of the divine action consist; and that the simplicity of the means is in balance with the richness of the effects. [...] This is why there can be no doubt that the happiness of spirits is the principal end of God and that he puts this principle into practice as far as the general harmony permits.“

From this starting point, Leibniz gives us a simple explanation of the „general economy of the world“:

“As for the simplicity of the ways of God, this is shown especially in the means which he uses, whereas the variety, opulence, and abundance appears in regard to the ends or results. The one ought thus to be in equilibrium with the other, just as the funds intended for a building should be proportional to the size and beauty one requires in it. It is true that nothing costs God anything, even less than it costs a philosopher to build the fabric of his imaginary world out of hypotheses, since God has only to make his decrees in order to create a real world. But where wisdom is concerned, decrees or hypotheses are comparable to expenditures, in the degree to which they are independent of each other, for reason demands that we avoid multiplying hypotheses or principles, somewhat as the simplest system is always preferred in astronomy.“¹⁵

Here, God seems to be understood not only according to the model of the *demiurgos*, the craftsman or architect of creation, but also as the *despotes*, the household-manager, who adds to mere structural thinking a kind of balancing or effectiveness regarding rationality and moral values. The principle of the best in conjunction with the principle of parsimony establishes an economy of creation, guaranteeing the highest order and the greatest rational accessibility.

A question arises: what are the differences between *oeconomia rerum* and *harmonia rerum*? Harmony is famously defined as unity in variety¹⁶ or as simplicity in multitude¹⁷. Thus it is basically an ontological principle, uniting that which can only be conceived in terms of opposite notions. Economy, on the other hand, should rather be

understood as an activity, which establishes a moral order within any variety or multitude – the economy of things will relate the physical things to values or perfections, amongst them harmony, while the political economy will establish a moral order within the government, the territory and its population.

While *harmonia rerum* can thus be conceived as an *attribute* of the world, *economy* would rather be the initial activity of creation, involving three elements: *Oeconomia* designates the fact that the divine *wisdom* (*principle of parsimonia*), motivated by divine *will* (*the happiness of spirits is the principal end of God*), leads to the *act* of creation (*puts this principle into practice*). *Oikonomia* is best conceived as something which is unfolding or has yet to unfold itself; while *harmonia* is already established. In this sense, maybe the harmony within the world is best understood as the result of the divine economy.

If we take this idea seriously, we should understand *oeconomia* as a normatively directed activity of the divine mind, placing Leibniz into the patristic tradition. We also can conclude that *oeconomia* establishes the deontic or normative structure of the physical world, whereas *harmonia* rather establishes the logical structure of world and thought. This would also fit with the way how Leibniz uses the term *oeconomia* almost exclusively in discussions about the divine will, providence and the *dispensatio* of grace, while harmony in turn is one of the central notions in the debate on the metaphysical foundation of science.

Within the divine economy, values or moral perfections serve as criteria for the creation of the physical world. Leibniz lists several values that he conceives as a direct result of the agreement of unity and plurality: „happiness, pleasure, love, perfection, being, power, freedom, harmony, order, and beauty are all tied to each other“¹⁸. This connection establishes a general ‘sympathy’¹⁹, which not only connects these goods with each other, but also leads us to find pleasure and happiness in the understanding of the general harmony of the world. It is important to note here, that harmony can actually be understood and perceived, while we are unable to grasp the divine economy of the world:

“To be the best, and to be desired by those who are most virtuous and wise, comes to the same thing. And it may be said that, if we could [!] understand the structure and the economy of the universe, we should find that it is made and directed as the wisest and most virtuous could wish it, since God cannot fail to do thus.“²⁰

Despite the fact that the human mind follows the same principles as the divine mind, Leibniz states that the divine providence of the *oeconomia rerum* is a “secret”, hidden from human insight. In contrast, we know that the just dispensation of grace is directly aimed at the benefit of humans. If we could grasp the actual dispensation according to each one’s merits, we would understand the purpose of all things and not feel any complaint or sadness about the state of the world any longer, arriving at the most desirable state of bliss. Those who do not love God above all, those are kept from any insight into his plans²¹. The economy of things is a metaphysical postulate only justifiable through faith, while the harmony of things is directly accessible in the perception of the beauty and moral perfections of the world.

4. *The economy of grace*

God is not present in the world. Leibniz makes it very clear that God does not interact with the world; he does not actively distribute his grace amongst people as a reaction to their behaviour. If we conceive of the divine economy as a kind of activity, it is not a temporally extended activity, but rather an activity of the divine will, because it has to be distinguished from the laws of logic.

It should be noted, that this kind of teleological determination is not an external determination: Neither the world as a whole, nor the single facts or events are *used* by an external factor as a means to an end. As the divine providence is hidden from human insight, only the harmony of things can be experienced and researched by science (at least as far as it concerns natural laws and the disposition of natural goods). The dispensation of grace is thus

beyond human grasp. Leibniz makes it very clear that the world strives for justice and does not rely on any external judge or executive power:

“There is good reason to believe, following the parallelism of the two realms, that of final causes and that of efficient causes, that God has established in the universe a connection between punishment or reward and bad or good action, in accordance where-with the first should always be attracted by the second, and virtue and vice obtain their reward and their punishment in consequence of the natural sequence of things [...].”²²

The economy of grace thus consists of two sides of the same coin: Each individuum is given a set of natural dispositions which correspond to a dispensation of grace. The ability of any individuum corresponds to its virtue.

“I think that one is more worthy of praise when one owes the action to one’s good qualities, and the more culpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one’s evil qualities.”²³

Even though it may seem strange to us that the moral value of an action depends on whether it follows a good disposition or not, we nevertheless have to *believe* in the justice of God. The natural dispositions, as given by God, correspond to his dispensation of grace, according to his justice:

“I think therefore that since we do not know how much and in what way God takes into consideration the natural dispositions in dispensing his grace, it will be most exact and certain to say, [...] that it has pleased God to choose this one person for actual existence among an infinity of other equally possible persons [...].”²⁴

The justice of God, again, establishes a *balanced* world, not only in regard to the natural dispositions, as is explained in the *Discours de Métaphysique*, but especially in regard to the dispensation of virtues and grace:

“The justice of God, which in fact consists in the *dispensatio* of good and bad against

others, is of well-proportioned measure, that it agrees with the wisdom and grace of God.”²⁵

The moral economy of the world follows directly from the two relevant attributes of divinity, infinite wisdom and justice. Both lead to a divine decree, which is finally put into reality by the power of the divine will. This action is to be understood in economic terms, that is, the *dispensatio* of good and bad to each being – not as an absolute measure, but in comparison to others. Leibniz even offers us a definition of the *dispensatio*:

“*Distribuere* is to assign several parts. So as we distribute a genus into species, we [also] assign their different alternative parts to the species. So as *Animal* contains *rational* and *irrational*, we assign the one to the human, the other to the beast. *Dispensare* is to distribute according to weight, just as the measured is distributed according to measure.”²⁶

This rather cryptic remark is probably to be understood as the distinction between the distribution of actual disposition and differences and those values or properties that come in different degrees or intensities. While the distribution of properties would be part of the divine mind, which conceives the possible individual entities according to the laws of logic, the dispensation of measured goods would be part of the will, according to justice.

5. Political economy as a mirror of the divine economy

Not only is the City of God a product of the divine economy, but the worldly states for which the princes serve as human *authoritates* are likewise to be understood as products of human economy. The economy of grace, as God has established it within the world as a whole, has to be mirrored by the human princes and other *authoritates* within their territory. Good government is, in a narrow sense, basically

*oeconomia*²⁷. In this way, economy as a science has to serve power²⁸. It is up to the princes to follow the economy of God's will in their own realm and to relate cause, decree and execution of their governmental activity in the same way as God does.

Leibniz explains the corresponding structure of *causa*, *decretum* and *executio* for both the human and the divine government in two detailed tables and calls it *oeconomia*²⁹. I will merely give a short sketch of one of these tables, since a full discussion would go beyond the limits of this essay:

As the *cause* of God's decision is the *sapientiae divinae*, the prince's cause shall be the *prudential conformis*. God's *decree* is the glorification of Christ and salvation, the prince's decree shall be knowledge. The *executio* of God's will is the dispensation of grace and perfections (i. e. absolute goods) to each individuum; the prince shall be expected to execute his will by the dispensation of goods with purposeful qualities³⁰. While the causal structure of the world will bring forth just causes, fair punishments and justified reward by itself, because it is designed by God to realize the best of all possible worlds, the prince has to govern his states and its institutions in a similar way. He has to imitate the divine wisdom and justice in his actions. Learning and good will play an essential role in government: The princes are, when they are educated in the arts of knowledge and thus able and willing to arrive at some knowledge of God himself, nothing less than the *oeconomi* of God³¹. The human economy shall follow the divine economy in establishing a just distribution of goods amongst its servants, because the governmental activity of the human prince mirrors the divine activity on a smaller scale.

It is not surprising that Leibniz conceives a foundation and justification of human politics in a corresponding structure of both human and divine minds and actions. It is, however, remarkable, that this foundation of politics is included in his concept of *oeconomia*. This could be a fertile ground for further research on the metaphysical foundations of Leibniz's political philosophy.

Notes

1. For Leibniz's writings, I will use the following abbreviations: : A=German Academy of Sciences (ed.) *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, Potsdam, Leipzig et. al., Akademie-Verlag 1926-; DM=G. W. Leibniz: *Discourse on Metaphysics*, 1686; GP=C. I. Gerhardt (ed.): *Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, 6 Vols., Darmstadt, Olms 1978.
2. Agamben (2011), p. 22. Unfortunately, there is no single theological sense of the term *oikonomia* which is passed on through the theological literature (Richter (2005), p. 2) and both Agamben and Richter caution strongly to project any alleged sense, any presumed traditional meaning ('divine design', for example) within the general language of Christianity onto any author (e. g. Agamben (2011), p. 21). The concept of *oikonomia* does not only undergo an enormous process of transformation, it also connects theological questions with those of power, justice, the rules of government (both human and divine) and – finally – economics.
3. Within the first three centuries after Christ this expression of an "economy of the mystery" will be reversed into "mystery of the economy", see Agamben (2011), pp. 38 ff. and p. 50. This concerns the historical dispensation of grace by God's decree. There is also another sense of *oikonomia*, meaning the division of the divine unity into a trinity of persons which does not seem to be of any relevance to Leibniz' writings and will consequently be ignored here.
4. See Agamben (2011), p. 2. Francis Young remarks: "Tertullian's use of the word 'dispensation' (that is, *dispensatio* as the Latin equivalent the Greek *oikonomia*) may perhaps help to capture the meaning: it concerns God's providential 'arrangements', which dispose unity into trinity, creating a plurality without division. He draws attention to the one empire, and the fact that the emperor may share the sovereignty with his son as agent without that sovereignty being divided, even noting that provincial governors do not detract from the single monarchy." Young, Francis M.: *Monotheism and Christology*, in: *Cambridge History of Christianity, Book I: Origins to Constantine*, edited by Margaret Mitchel and Frances M. Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 452-469, here: p. 461.

5. One of the very few notable exceptions: A IV, vii, p. 332: “Und dann eine lange zeit hernach des dazu gekommenen Calvini eigene tieffe gedanken, von der göttlichen oeconomii in dem werck der Menschlichen seeligkeit, welche von den meisten nachfolgern des Zwinglii angenommen worden.” According to Richter (2005), Calvin does not talk very often of *oikonomia* and Richter points out only one passage of significance. In this passage, however, Calvin refers to 1. Kor. 4.1 and defines *Oikonomia* as the communication of the secrets of the divine wisdom (*dispensanda coelestis sapeintiae*) and the management of God’s household, which is destined to be build and established (*et ipsum Dei domum aedificandam et constituendam destinantur*). Calvin, John: *Opera*, Book 5, p. 283; quoted by Richter (2005), p. 629. Agamben remarks: “*In modern Protestant theology, the problem of oikonomia reappeared, but only as an obscure and indeterminate precursor of the theme of Heilsgeschichte, while the opposite is true: the theology of the ‘history of salvation’ is a partial and, all in all, reductive resumption of a much broader paradigm.*” Agamben (2011), p. 2.
6. A IV, iii, p. 275.
7. For example A II, i, p. 153.
8. A IV, vii, p. 654: “Auch schohn vor Christo hat man schohn deßen gesez geprediget, Moses selbst wenns zum Neuen gehorsam gegoten, hat nicht sein unerträgliches sondern Christi sanfftes *joch* angesonnen, doch ist die oeconomia im alten Testament nicht so deutlich gewesen. Das scharffe gesez ist nur sünden rügend, und kan nicht gehalten werden, wie der neue gehorsam[.] Lex Mosis est tentativa, Christi normativa ad salutem[.]”
9. See the editors remark at A IV, vii, p. 653.
10. *De Ordinanda Bibliotheca* (ca. 1693?): “Principia nomothesiae, seu politica et oeconomica ad Leges applicata [...]; Oeconomica de privata utilitate [...]; Oeconomica physica [...]”, A IV, v, p. 626 ff.
11. See Beeley (1996), pp. 212 ff.; see also Busche (1997), p. 429.
12. A VI, ii, p. 244.
13. DM § II.
14. DM § XXI, translation following Leibniz (1989). This is very different from the earlier conception in the *Hypothesis Physica Nova*, A VI, ii, p. 255; Leibniz repeats the connection between the economy as given by divine law, but as a consequence of a free will and *not* a geometricising God in A VI, iv, 2845.
15. DM § V, translation following Leibniz (1989), pp. 305 f.
16. A VI, iv, p. 1358: “Harmonia est unitas in varietate”.
17. A VI, iii, p. 588: “Harmonia hoc ipsum est, simplicitas quaedam in multitudine.”
18. GP VII, p. 87.
19. GP VII, p. 86. Leibniz asserts that we often do not know what it is in the object that we like and that it is this ignorance that we call sympathy.
20. “Etre le meilleur, et être désiré par les plus vertueux et les plus sages, est la même chose. Et l’on peut dire que si nous pouvions entendre la structure et l’oeconomie de l’Univers, nous trouverions qu’il est fait et gouverné comme les plus sages et les plus vertueux le pourroient souhaiter, Dieu ne pouvant manquer de faire ainsi.” GP VI, p. 236.
21. A VI, iv, p. 2320: “Itaque pro certo habendum est, qui possent intelligere arcanam totius providentiae oeconomiam, deprehensuros esse, neminem jure posse queri, nihilque melius posse optari; quod qui sciunt non possunt non amare Deum super omnia, etiamsi nondum ad distinctam consilii divini cognitionem visionemque beatificam sint admissi.”
22. *Theodicy*, Book I, § 74, GP VI, p. 142.
23. “Je pense qu’on est plus louable quand on doit l’action à ses bonnes qualités, et plus coupable à mesure qu’on y a été disposé par ses qualités mauvaises.” *Theodicy*, Appendix III, § 19, GP VI, p. 421.
24. “Je croy donc (puisque nous ne sçavons pas, combien ou comment Dieu a egard aux dispositions naturelles, dans la dispensation de la grace) que le plus exact et le plus seur est de dire, [...] qu’il a plû à Dieu de la choisir parmi une infinité d’autres personnes egalement possibles [...]” DM § XXXI, A VI, iv, p. 1579.
25. *Unvorgreifliches Bedencken*: “Mit der Gerechtigkeit Gottes welche in der dispensation des guhten und bösen gegen andere eigentlich beruhet, hatt es ebenmäßige Bewantnis, daß sie mit der weißheit und mit der güte gottes sich verstehen müße.” A IV, vii, p. 465.
26. “*Distribuere est partes pluribus assignare. Ita etiam cum genus distribuimus in species, partes ejus alternativas id est differentias, speciebus assignamus. Ita Animal continet rationale, et irrationale, illud homini, hoc bruto assignamus. Dispensare est distribuere secundum pondus, quemadmodum Dimensum est distributum secundum mensuram.*” *Definitions according to Wilkins*, A VI, iv, p. 32.

27. A IV, iii, p. 617: “[...] la bonne police ou oeconomie[...]”.
28. In a table concerning the uses of the different faculties: “Oeconomicae finis opes”, A IV, v, p. 597.
29. A IV, vii, pp. 362 f.
30. See A IV, vii, pp. 358 f. and A IV, vii, p. 538.
31. A IV, v, p. 672: “Principis imperium nunc artibus instruit alm[is].] Ut summi oeconomum se sciat esse DEI [...]”.

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