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In what sense is Frege’s (Statement of the) Puzzle “problematic”?1

Resumen: En este artículo me ocupo de la explicación de Glezakos (2009) de por qué el puzzle de Frege no es problemático. Desde el punto de vista de Glezakos, la formulación de Frege del puzzle –¿cómo pueden oraciones de la forma a=a y a=b, si son verdaderas, diferir en valor cognitivo, si expresan el mismo contenido semántico y son verdaderas por la autoidentidad del mismo objeto?– no debería considerarse problemática, puesto que el puzzle implica circularidad, o porque, planteado neutralmente, ni siquiera puede ser formulado. En contra de esto argumento que si, como ella lo considera, la formulación de Frege es “problemática”, no lo es por las razones que Glezakos proporciona, sino porque se basa en un par de suposiciones cuestionables: las suposiciones de que i) no hay ambigüedad en cuanto a qué aspecto del signo (en su relación con el referente) es relevante para una formulación neutra del puzzle; y ii) las formas mismas de la (oración) son aquello de lo que cual uno puede aseverar, razonablemente, que difiere en valor cognitivo.


Abstract: In this paper I take issue with Glezakos’s (2009) account of why Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement of the puzzle –how can sentences of the form a=a and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic content/are made true by the same object’s self-identity?– should not be considered any puzzling either because it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against this that if, as she takes it, Frege’s statement is “problematic” it is not for the reasons she gives, but because it rests upon a couple of questionable assumptions; the assumptions that i) there is no ambiguity as to which aspect of the sign (in its relation to the referent) is relevant to a neutral statement of the puzzle ii) it is of the (sentence) forms themselves one may sensibly say they differ in cognitive value.

Key words: Frege’s puzzle. Cognitive value. Name individuation. Sentence forms. Type. Token.

A trend in recent literature on Frege’s puzzle has been to favour a problem-dissolving approach.2 By this, I mean a type of approach the aim of which is to free (philosophical) semanticists and epistemologists from the apparent need to meet the challenge(s) raised by it.

The challenge is this: how to explain that two true identity sentences of the form a=a and a=b differ in cognitive value if they do not differ as to what they say/that which makes them true? There are many ways to show that the challenge need not be met and, accordingly, that Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. One is to show that an element in it, the so-called “minor premise”, is question-begging. The difference in cognitive value (informativeness) of the identity sentences is, indeed, puzzling, in the face of the (alleged) identity of their semantic contents, only on the challengeable assumption that a
difference of informativeness involves (or reduces to) a difference of semantic contents. Another is to show that the phenomenon pointed out by Frege through his statement of the puzzle, viz. the obvious and uncontroversial fact that one can without irrationality refer to, or think of, the same object using different singular terms without knowing that one does, is puzzling only if the data on which its rests are coupled with an assumption that has arguably little to do with semantics, the assumption that one cannot refer to, or think of, the object unless one knows which object it is – in Wettstein’s terminology, unless one has a “cognitive fix” on it. Still another possibility is to show that on all (metaphysical, semantical, cognitive) versions of it, the puzzle arises only insofar as the empirical data – about identity and identity statements, the relationship between synonymy and sameness of cognitive value, that between sameness of information content and informativeness of objectual-identity judgments – involved in its formulation have been systematically skewed by prior epistemic concerns; so that once the disentangling is done there is no reason to feel any puzzled by so-called “Frege puzzles.”

A recent further instance of this type of approach is Glezakos’s (2009). In this short yet significant paper, the author argues that the puzzle cannot be posed as it is by Frege (1892) either because it involves a petitio principii – it assumes that which it is meant to establish, namely the necessity of the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung – or because, neutrally posed, it cannot be set up. Either way, it should not be considered, on Glezakos’s account, any puzzling either by the non-Fregeans (who take the notion of Sinn to be highly problematic and useless) or the Fregeans (who supposedly use the distinction as a general framework both to generate and solve the puzzle).

Although I agree with Glezakos (2009: 202) that Frege’s statement of the puzzle is “problematic”, I do not think it is for the reasons she gives. So, after reviewing her argument and raising a few objections against it (section 1), I shall try to correctly pinpoint the source of the problem (section 2). As I see it, the problem stems from a couple of questionable assumptions made just as much by Frege in the original statement as by Glezakos on her account of why it is un-puzzling. So, if I am right, the point also holds against her.

1. Sameness of Name

Glezakos’s Account

To make my point, I need to give a more detailed outline of Glezakos’s account. Drawing on Kaplan’s (1989: 598 n.70; 1990: 95) insightful suggestions, she assumes that the number of names, or perhaps more adequately, of singular terms contained in the identity sentences (whose forms are given, respectively, by the schemas a=a, or b=b, and a=b) matters to a neutral statement of the puzzle. It matters, on her view, in the following sense: if a neutral way of stating it is at all available – as seems reasonable to assume if Frege is to avoid the fallacy of taking for granted that which the necessity of is to be established, it must be one on which the individuation of the respective forms of the identity sentences is explained in terms of one name occurring twice in the a=a (or b=b) schema, on the one hand, and two names occurring once in the a=b schema, on the other hand. If this is how identity-sentence forms are (ultimately) individuated, Frege must have at his disposal, so goes the story, some independent criterion of name individuation – one independent, that is, of any appeal to the notion of Sinn.

It is at this point that Glezakos’s boldest yet questionable interpretive move comes in. Taking the notorious footnote B as evidence, she claims that Frege (1892), if not explicitly, is at least implicitly committed to a substantive and general view of sameness of name on which it is the same whenever the same relation holds between the sign and the referent. Thus, to take footnote B example, the ordinary proper name ‘Aristotle’ is, on the view she ascribes to Frege, the same on its twofold occurrence in “Aristotle=Aristotle” provided the (designating) relation between the sign and its referent (Bedeutung) remains unchanged. That this is Frege’s view is supposedly
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Be it as it may, it is this view, along with the required availability of an independent account of identity-sentence form individuation, which leads Glezakos to deliver her own diagnosis. As she sees it, the puzzle neutrally stated cannot be set up as no epistemic divide between sentences of the form \( a=a \) (or \( b=b \)) and \( a=b \) of the sort Frege takes to be a key element in the puzzle arises in the first place.

To see this, it is worth remembering that, on Frege’s (1892) classic statement of the puzzle, it is not the contrast alone between a trivial (or uninformative) truth and an informative one that generates the puzzle, but the contrast together with the assumption that identity statements of the form \( a=a \) and \( a=b \) mean the same – in metaphysically-laden terms, express the same relation of a thing to itself. So, if it ever turns out that no epistemic divide of the sort pointed out by Frege ensues from his (alleged) view about what makes a name the same, there will be no reason to feel any puzzled by this since there is, so it seems, nothing particularly puzzling about the fact that the same proposition (relation) can be expressed by sentences of the form \( a=a \) (or \( b=b \)) and \( a=b \) provided that ‘a’ and ‘b’ in “\( a=b \)” stand for the same object and ‘=’ for the same identity relation in “\( a=a \)” and “\( a=b \)”.

That no “in-principle epistemic divide” (2009: 204) between sentences of the form \( a=a \) (or \( b=b \)) and \( a=b \) ensues from Frege’s (alleged) view is supposedly evidenced by the fact that a subject can without irrationality deny the truth of an identity sentence of the form \( a=a \) (or \( b=b \)) wherein the same name occurs twice, or get to learn by way of empirical investigation that the same sentence is true. If those possibilities are open – as it seems they are –, this means that the content of a statement of the form \( a=a \) (or \( b=b \)) can be just as informative and a posteriori justifiable as that of a statement of the form \( a=b \) and, accordingly, that no epistemic contrast can be drawn between the two identity-sentence forms. Frege’s puzzle, so it seems, cannot be posed because, neutrally stated, it cannot even get off the ground.

Rejoinder(s)

For one thing, it is doubtful Frege has ever put forth a general criterion of name individuation of the kind ascribed to him by Glezakos. The fact that, in the footnote B example, the sign/referent relation remains unchanged across the name’s occurrences is no evidence in favour of his having entertained a substantive and general conception of name individuation. It is, rather, something Frege assumes or postulates for the sake of the example in order to show that different speakers can attach different senses to the same ordinary proper name.

For another, the epistemic contrast Glezakos takes not to follow from Frege’s (alleged) view of name individuation is drawn by Frege on altogether different grounds, namely on logical rather than semantic grounds. As Frege understands it, the difference of epistemic profiles of sentences of the form \( a=a \) (or \( b=b \)) and \( a=b \) is owed to a difference pertaining to the respective grounds on which they are true and known to be true. Sentences of the form \( a=a \) are instances of the (self-) identity law, viz. \( \forall x \ x=x \), which is a logical truth. So, it is enough to know that \( \forall x \ x=x \) is true to know that \( a=a \) is. By contrast, sentences of the form \( a=b \) are empirical (as opposed to logical) truths that require a special act of recognition on the part of the subject to be known as such. So, there surely is for Frege an intractable epistemic difference between sentences of the form \( a=a \) and \( a=b \) precisely because their respective epistemic profiles are not spelled out by Frege on the basis of a general criterion of name individuation plus an account of what it takes to know their truth, but on the basis of logical considerations. Claiming, as Glezakos does, that there is no “in-principle epistemic divide” on a neutral statement of the puzzle because in both cases some “ability to recognize that the referent is the same” (2009: 205) is required simply misses the logical point.

Finally, her argument is conclusive only on the assumption that the number of names
contained in the identity sentences matters to a neutral statement of the puzzle. The assumption is questionable, for the Kripke-like cases sometimes appealed to to argue that an identity sentence containing two distinct occurrences of the same name may be informative and known \emph{a posteriori} (viz. after empirical investigation) can be taken to show, instead, that \emph{no matter how many names} occur in the sentence, its truth may be considered nontrivial and \emph{a posteriori} knowable depending on whether the name is \emph{used} in both of its occurrences to refer to the same object.\footnote{On this view, it is not essential to a neutral statement of the puzzle (one that does not appeal to a difference of senses) that two names, instead of one, occur in the identity sentence for the sentence to contain \emph{[a] “very valuable extension(s) of our knowledge”} (Frege 1892: 25) or for its truth to be known only after empirical investigation. Take a couple of true sentences of the form $a=a$ (or $b=b$), say (i) “Paderewski is Paderewski” and (ii) “Paderewski is Paderewski”. Suppose that in (i) each occurrence of the name is used for a different object, say Paderewski-the-politician and Paderewski-the-musician. Suppose that in (ii) both occurrences of the name are used for the same object, say Paderewski-the-musician (or Paderewski-the-politician). Intuitively, the two sentences have different cognitive values; the former being informative while the other is uninformative. It all turns, of course, on what the names are \emph{used} for on their occurrences. Now take a couple of true sentences of the form $a=b$, say (iii) “this bachelor is this unmarried man” and (iv) “this bachelor is this unmarried man”\footnote{Intuitively, (iii) may be considered old hat by someone who takes the nominal phrases to be synonymous and (iv) can be considered informative if ‘this’ on each of its occurrences is used for a different part of the man’s body –while some parts are, say, hidden by a pillar.} Intuitively, (iii) may be considered old hat by someone who takes the nominal phrases to be synonymous and (iv) can be considered informative if ‘this’ on each of its occurrences is used for a different part of the man’s body –while some parts are, say, hidden by a pillar.

The conclusion to draw from this is that Frege’s puzzle neither is circular, for it is originally stated on the basis of logical rather than semantic considerations, nor impossible to set up on a neutral statement of it, for the difference of epistemic profiles of the identity sentences need not be reflected at the syntactic level, as witnessed by my examples of true identity sentences of the same form having different cognitive values.}

Now, my aim here is not to defend the integrity of the puzzle against circularity objections, nor to show that it can be set up no matter how many names occur in the identity sentences. It is, rather, to correctly pinpoint the source of the problem, as I think it has been mislocated by Glezakos on her explanation of why Frege’s puzzle is problematic.

2. Type-Token Ambiguity, Sentence Forms, and Cognitive Value(s)

It might be replied that on Frege’s \emph{original} statement of the puzzle, the number of names occurring in the identity sentences \emph{does} matter since \emph{analytic and a priori justified are, on Frege’s view, exclusively predicable of sentences of the form $a=a$ while synthetic and not-always-a-priori justified are exclusively predicable of sentences of the form $a=b$}. Moreover, no pragmatic theory of reference is available within Frege’s semantic framework, at least as far as proper names are concerned. An interesting question to ask, however, is the following: why are those options simply not open to him? Answering it, the idea is, may give us a clue as to where the source of the problem is to be located.

As I see it, the problem does not stem from the alleged circularity of the statement, nor from the impossibility, on a neutral statement, to generate the epistemic divide required to set up the puzzle, but from a couple of questionable assumptions made by Frege on its original formulation:

(i) There is no ambiguity as to \emph{which aspect} of the sign (in its relation to the referent) is to be considered relevant to a neutral statement of the puzzle.

(ii) It is of the identity-sentence forms themselves one may sensibly say they are true, false, nontrivially or trivially true (informative or uninformative).

I shall consider in turn each assumption and show that Frege not only is committed to making them, but also leaves them unsupported.
on his own statement of the puzzle; hence its “problematic” character.

That Frege is committed to (i) is evidenced by the following fact: one single name can be said to occur twice in sentences of the form $a=a$ only on the assumption that the identity at stake here is type identity. And in sentences of the form $a=b$, two names can be said to occur once (each) only on the assumption that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are tokens of distinct types.\(^\text{12}\) Now, as far as interpreted sentences are concerned, the assumption is clearly challengeable on the grounds that which aspects of the sign are to be considered relevant to judgments of sameness and distinctness (therefore, to the puzzle) is a matter of linguistic conventions. Suppose it is decided in some linguistic community that, when it comes to judging whether a linguistic item is the same or different from another, priority should be given to the unrepeatable physical (written or spoken) item rather than to that which is physically instantiated once or twice.\(^\text{13}\) An utterance of a sentence of the form $a=a$, or $b=b$ (with assertoric force) may, then, be taken to express just as informative and a posteriori knowable a truth as an utterance of a sentence of the form $a=b$ on the type-oriented approach. Conversely, an utterance of a sentence of the form $a=b$ may be taken to express just as analytic and a priori knowable a truth as an utterance of a sentence of the form $a=a$ (or $b=b$) on the type-oriented approach. So, it is a mistake or at least an oversimplification to claim that an epistemic contrast is or is not available simpliciter — no matter which aspects of the signs are deemed relevant to a neutral statement of the puzzle.

The evidence that Frege is committed to (ii) is quite straightforward since he claims (1892: 25) that “$a=a$ and $a=b$”, if true, “are obviously sentences (Sätze) of differing cognitive value [Erkenntniswert]” and that the former “holds a priori [...]” while sentences of the form $a=b$ often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always been established a priori\(^\text{14}\). He thereby draws no clear distinction between true, false, informative and uninformative, thought of as properties of uninterpreted as opposed to interpreted sentences. The assumption is contentious as, in contemporary logic at least, sentence forms like $a=a$ (or $b=b$) and $a=b$ are neither true, nor false; let alone informatively or trivially so. They are, as Glezakos (2009: 203) herself points out, “schemas”, that is, representations of the composition of sentences arrived at by abstracting from actual names and verbs occurring in actual sentences.\(^\text{14}\) As they are, they say nothing and, accordingly, are neither truth-evaluable nor worth of epistemic evaluation. It is not the forms themselves that can sensibly be said to be true or false, but instances of them taken from already interpreted natural languages such as “Paderewski is Paderewski”, “Scott is the author of Waverley”, “This bachelor is this unmarried man”, etc.\(^\text{15}\)

Of course, this cannot be Frege’s view since he has a different conception both of logic and of its subject matter. On his view, it makes sense to speak of the truth of $a=a$ and $a=b$ only to the extent that they are taken in the first place to express truth-evaluable contents — “thoughts” in his terminology. To the extent that logic deals (or, at least, must deal) with contentful sentences, one is allowed to speak of informative or trivial sentences of such and such form. Frege, so it seems, can be rescued by arguing that, on his own conception of logic, there is no room for the contemporary distinction between uninterpreted (sentence) forms and interpreted ones and that, as a consequence, his view is immune to criticisms stemming from a contemporary “schematic” conception of logic.\(^\text{16}\)

Still, there is a worry about why Frege says and whether he is ever allowed to say that some (in contrast to other) sentences are informative (or trivial) in virtue of having such and such form. Unless he provides us with a substantial story about how such forms are given (or whether they are at all), one cannot take (ii) to be backed by the sheer data — viz. by the obvious informativeness, as opposed to the non-informativeness, of some natural-language sentences in some of their uses.\(^\text{17}\)

This suggests that the puzzle as stated in the opening paragraphs of Frege (1892) is indeed problematic, yet not for the reasons given by Glezakos (2009). For, she is no position to give her account unless she makes the same kind of questionable assumptions as Frege’s. A better option, so it seems, would be to question the purported capacity of Frege’s statement to accommodate the sheer data without distorting them by prior
epistemic concerns as to how sentence forms must be given if the corresponding contents are to count as trivial (as opposed to informative) and \textit{a priori} (as opposed \textit{a posteriori}) knowable. If nothing of the sort turns out to be possible, Frege’s puzzle is, so it seems, doomed to dissolve unless one has a better formulation to give.

**Notes**

1. Research for this paper has benefited from the financial support of the PUC-Rio (Bolsa de Incentivo à Productividade em Ensino e Pesquisa 2012-2014) and the CAPES/COFECUB (scheme number 690/10). I am grateful to these institutions.

2. This is not new. The trend goes back, as far as I can tell, to Wettstein’s (1986, 1988, 1989, 1991) and Salmon’s (1986) groundbreaking works. Late representatives include Wettstein (2004), Almog (2008), and Glezakos (2009).

3. The assumption can be challenged on the ground that the semantic content (viz. what is said) encoded by the two sentences when used to state something should not be conflated with the pragmatic information imparted on uttering them. See Salmon (1986, 77-79).


5. This is, in a nutshell, Almog’s (2008) strategy.

6. The paper focuses on ordinary proper names. However, Frege’s puzzle is originally intended to cover a full range of expressions ‘a’ and ‘b’ stand for in the above-mentioned schemas: ordinary proper names, definite descriptions, and presumably demonstratives and indexicals as well. They all are \textit{Eigennamen} in the generic, puzzle-relevant sense of linguistic expressions standing for determinate objects. See Frege (1892, 27). Had Glezakos paid enough attention to other members of the category, notably simple demonstratives like ‘this’ accompanied by pointing gestures, she might have come to the opposite conclusion that the puzzle can be posed even though no difference appears at the syntactic level between the identity sentences. I owe this point to Marco Ruffino.

7. To be fair, the author does not claim that this is the \textit{only} way to account for the individuation of identity-sentence forms. All she claims is that this account is “the most natural one” (Glezakos, 2009, 203). However, the fact that no alternative account is considered in the paper limits considerably its scope and relevance.

8. On Frege’s statement of the puzzle the metaphysical and semantical issues are mixed up where they should be carefully distinguished. This may give us a further, yet different reason to be suspicious about his own statement. On this, see Almog (2008, 555-568).

9. “Even today the recognition (\textit{Wiedererkennung}) of a small planet or a comet is not always a matter of course” (Frege, 1892, 25-26). See also Beaney (1997, 365).

10. By ‘Kripke-like cases’, I mean the sort of case in which it may be discovered (or wondered whether) the same object (person) was referred to by two occurrences of a name, say ‘Paderewski (the musician)’ and ‘Paderewski (the politician)’, as it is happens with Pierre in Kripke’s (1979) story. These are run-of-the-mill cases often experienced in real-life situations.

11. I borrow this example from Corazza and Dokić (1995: 164 fn4).

12. Here I need not get into the debate as to whether there are types and, if so, what they are. I assume there are and that an important feature of them is their having tokens (thought of as unrepeatable physical items). Like Wetzel (2009), I find it convenient to think of types as abstract objects in the broad, Fregean sense of ‘object’.

13. As Searle (1958, 167) rightly points out, “some codes are like this”.

14. Note that the equal sign (‘=’) sometimes used in (some) natural languages to express identities –this paper is no exception!- is not, strictly speaking, part of them. So, there is a substantial issue as to how identities like “Paderewski is Paderewski” or “Scott is the author of Waverley” are to be translated into a logical language. E. g. it is not at all mandatory to translate an identity sentence such as the latter into a schema containing the equal sign, as shown convincingly by Russell (1905). On this, see Almog (2008, 553-554).


16. In \textit{On the Foundations of Geometry}, Frege (McGuinness (Ed.), 1984, 315) makes the following statement: ‘The word ‘interpretation’ is objectionable, for when properly expressed, a thought leaves no room for different interpretations. We have seen that ambiguity [\textit{Vieldeutigkeit}] must be rejected […].’ On the differences between Frege’s and the
contemporary “schematic” conception of logic, see Goldfarb (2001).

17. An obvious objection is that Frege is not interested, in the original formulation, in setting up a puzzle for natural-language semantics, but only for an ideal language—one designed for the expression and communication of scientific truths, discoveries, and demonstrations. I agree with that. But if the semantic structures picked out to this (primarily epistemological) end are ever applicable, the capacity of Frege’s statement to accommodate the data from natural language is back on the agenda. Thanks to David Chalmers and Dirk Greimann for the objection.


References


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Received: Tuesday, September 16, 2014.
Approved: Monday, September 22, 2014.