La teoría de la mente según el simulacionismo científico

Padilla Mora, Michael

doi:10.15517/ap.v21i108.28

Authors

Michael Padilla Mora Universidad de Costa Rica, Programa de Investigación en Neurociencias Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15517/ap.v21i108.28

Keywords:

Theory of mind, mirror neurons, simulationism, cognitive neuroscience, social cognition

Abstract

Recent results from the work developed in neuroscience seem to describe some fundamental points related to the operation of the theory of mind (ToM) among the Homo sapiens sapiens. The news has provoked controversy between the followers of the “simulationism” and the theory-theory supporters, granting with a special privilege to the view of the formers. Nevertheless, what we need right now, far from a return to a polarized discussion, is the development of a construct on theory of the mind (ToM) in accordance with the great body of the scientific research results. Neither the simulationism, nor the theory-theory, nor the modularism, or a mixed-hybrid perspective seems to be able to lead a true progress. In its place, a more appropriate project can be developed if we adopt a notion about human ToM in terms of our biological constitution and the resources that can be instantiated in that constitution. The evidence from neuroscience is suggested as a good support for that project.

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