La teoría de la mente según el simulacionismo científico

Padilla Mora, Michael

doi:10.15517/ktpsr204

Autores

Michael Padilla Mora Universidad de Costa Rica, Programa de Investigación en Neurociencias Autor

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15517/ktpsr204

Palavras-chave:

teoría de la mente, neuronas espejo, simulacionismo, neurociencia cognitiva, cognición social

Resumo

Resultados recientes de los trabajos en neurociencias describen algunos puntos fundamentales relacionados con el funcionamiento de la teoría de la mente (TdM) en el homo sapiens sapiens. Algunos hallazgos han suscitado polémica entre los seguidores del simulacionismo y los adeptos de la teoría-teoría, privilegiando especialmente el punto de vista de los primeros. En este artículo se argumenta que, lejos de regresar a una discusión polarizada, se requiere el desarrollo de un constructo de la teoría de la mente (TdM) acorde con el gran cuerpo de resultados de la investigación científica. Ni el simulacionismo ni la teoría-teoría, así como tampoco el modularismo ni una perspectiva híbrida entre esos enfoques parece capaz de dirigir un verdadero progreso. En su lugar, una noción de la TdM humana en términos de nuestra constitución biológica y de los recursos que en esa constitución pueden verse instanciados, podría ser un camino más indicado. La evidencia neurocientífica se sugiere como un buen cimiento para ese proyecto.

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