Keywords
Intellectual humility. Epistemology of virtue. Knowledge. Epistemic subject. Ethics.
How to Cite
Abstract
I reflect on intellectual humility, problematizing it from an epistemological perspective of virtue and its relationship with the production and dissemination of knowledge in academic and scientific life, and some other complications that it faces such as arrogance, vanity and servility. intellectual.
References
Bibliografía
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