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- May 31, 2025 (2)
- May 26, 2025 (1)
Keywords
etica animal
capacitismo
discapacidad
argument from marginal cases
animal ethics
ableism
disability
How to Cite
Abstract
According to Peter Singer’s perspective, there are marginal human beings. However, the alleged marginality in this argument arises from positioning disabled individuals within a hierarchy of cognitive abilities, under the pretext of the capacities they lack. This is what I seek to challenge by questioning the notion of marginality in the argument, which frames disability as misfortune. To do so, I review some of the most significant critiques of the argument of marginal cases and propose an approach rooted in critical disability studies, through the lens of «ableist bias»
References
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