Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica ISSN Impreso: 0034-8252 ISSN electrónico: 2215-5589

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On the Unfinished and Uncertain Paths of Logic
Vol. 64 No. 169 (2025), Dossier II
Vol. 64 No. 169 (2025)

On the Unfinished and Uncertain Paths of Logic: The Case of Non-Monotonic Logics

Dossier II
https://doi.org/10.15517/revfil.2025.65009
Published May 26, 2025 — Updated on June 2, 2025
Jorge Morales Delgado
University of Costa Rica
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Keywords

Kant
Lógica
Razonamiento
No-monotonía
Retractibilidad
Kant
Logic
Reasoning
no-monotonicity
defeasibility

How to Cite

Morales Delgado, J. (2025). On the Unfinished and Uncertain Paths of Logic: The Case of Non-Monotonic Logics. Revista De Filosofía De La Universidad De Costa Rica, 64(169). https://doi.org/10.15517/revfil.2025.65009 (Original work published May 26, 2025)
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Abstract

In the prologue of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant offers a vision of logic as a science completely finished. Nevertheless, further advances have proven this Kantian idea wrong. The current work offers a discussion of non-monotonic logics and some of the philosophical presuppositions as an example of a formal system of very recent development with an interdisciplinary background that allows us to understand a particular class of inferences of human reasoning. In this sense, non-monotonic logics are a paradigmatic case which shows how distant is logic from being a perfect and finished science.

https://doi.org/10.15517/revfil.2025.65009
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