Palabras clave
pensamiento y lenguaje
ontogenia
filogenia
meta-representación
cognitive rewiring
thought and language
ontogeny
phylogeny
meta-representation
Cómo citar
Resumen
En el presente trabajo indagamos en una concepción cognitiva del lenguaje a través de un examen de la “hipótesis del recableado” propuesta por Bermúdez (2005), según la cual la adquisición del lenguaje (tanto en la ontogenia como en la filogenia) genera una profunda reestructuración de la arquitectura de la cognición, haciendo posibles nuevas formas de procesamiento y representación. Con el fin de evaluar esta hipótesis, exploramos sus dimensiones ontogénica y filogénica, concluyéndose que la evidencia disponible solo respalda cierta versión filogénica de esta hipótesis. Más precisamente, que durante la evolución del lenguaje se habría “recableado” la cognición haciendo posible la capacidad de meta-representación, en tanto que durante la adquisición de una lengua no se produce una reconfiguración sustantiva de la arquitectura de la cognición.
Citas
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