Keywords
ethics
environmental conservation
nature
life
valor moral
ética
conservación ambiental
naturaleza
vida
How to Cite
Abstract
Expanding the boundaries of morality by reconceptualizing the intrinsic value of non-human nature is a promising philosophical option for the practice of a renewed and robust environmental ethics. Intrinsic value is a good in itself of all living entities in nature, which is why it is objective. This good has its etiology in some unique and unrepeatable evolutionary processes by natural selection. Intrinsic value is not derived from its utility, it is not a means, and it constitutes the purpose of all species of biodiversity in their different habitats, because that is their interest for the self-realization of their existence. Likewise, it is autonomous based on its usefulness or application based on another concept or subject. This kind of value in its definition is dependent on the human valuing consciousness, hence, it is subjective or anthropogenic. The general objective of this article is to characterize the intrinsic value in environmental ethics, for which a systematic review of current and relevant bibliographic material is carried out, around the categorization of the topic. The information has been subjected to processing, analysis and comparison to arrive at the reflections presented. The study determined that the structuring elements of Nature have intrinsic value in themselves, regardless of their usefulness or benefit that they could represent for human beings. Thus, these elements have an inherent value for their self-realization, which is their biological interest and, therefore, they must be respected and protected for the conservation of life.
References
Acosta, Alberto. (2015). “El Buen Vivir Como Alternativa al Desarrollo. Algunas Reflexiones Económicas y No Tan Económicas.” Política Sociedad 52(2): 299–330.
Arancibia C., Fernando. (2019). Propiedades como portadoras del valor intrínseco. Revista de Humanidades, núm. 40, 2019, enero-junio, pp. 87-117.
Bayram, Selma Aydin. (2016). “The Use of the Concept of Intrinsic Value in Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Approaches in Environmental Ethics: A Metaethical Investigation.” Middle East Technical University.
Callicott, J. Baird. (1989). In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays on Environmental Philosophy. Edited by Dale Jamieson. Albany 1: 204–18.
Callicot, J. (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 14 (2): 129–43.
Callicott, J. Baird, and Baptiste Lanaspeze. (2010). L’Ethique de La Terre. París: Wildproject.
Cardoso André Luiz Lima. (2023). Holismo ambiental: Ética da Terra e Ecologia Profunda. Revista Instante, v.5, n.1, p.146-166.
Devall, Bill. (1988). “Deep Ecology and Its Critics.” The Trumpeter Journal of Ecosophy 5(2): 55–60.
Donner, Wendy. (2002). “Callicott on Intrinsic Value and Moral Standing in Environmental Ethics.” In Land, Value, Community: Callicott and Environmental Philosophy, edited by Wayne Ouderkirk and Jim Hill, 99–106. New York: State University of New York Press.
Gavilánez Elizalde Franklin. (2018). Caracterización del valor intrínseco antropogénico de la biodiversidad. El no-antropocentrismo y el ecocentrismo andino del Sumak Kawsay como forma de conservación de la Naturaleza no-humana y la vida. UPV/EHU Biblioteka 130 pp.
Goodpaster, Kenneth E. (1980). “On Stopping at Everything.” Environmental Ethics 2 (3): 281–284.
Gudynas, Eduardo. (2009). Diez Tesis Urgentes Sobre El Nuevo Extractivismo. In Extractivismo, Política y Sociedad, edited by Jurgen Schuldt and Alberto Acosta, 187–223. Quito: CAAP-CLAES.
Hargrove, Eugene C. (1992). “Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value.” Hegeler Institute The Monist 75(2): 183–207.
Hoyos, Ilva Myriam. (2005). De La Dignidad y de Los Derechos Humanos: Una Introducción al Pensar Analógico. Bogotá: Temis y Universidad de la Sabana Colombia.
Jamieson, Dale. (1998). Animal Liberation Is an Environmental Ethic. Environmental Values 7: 41–57.
Kant, Immanuel. (1998). Section I Transition from Common Rational to Philosophic Moral Cognition. In Immanuel Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, edited by Mary (& Traslate) Gregor, 1a ed., 7–18. Cambridge: Cambrige University Press.
Light, Andrew, and Holmes Rolston. (2003). Environmental Ethics: An Anthology. Edited by Andrew Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston. New York: Blackwell Pub.
Marcos, Alfredo & Valera, Luca. (2022). De la ética ambiental a la ecología humana. un cambio necesario. Pensamiento, vol.78, núm.298, pp.785-800.
Marmaneu, J.M., & Aznar F. J. (2017) “Why do we preserve biodiversity? A brief sociological, psychological and moral review”. Cuadernos de Biodiversidad 52 (18-23).
Megías Quirós, José Justo. (2007). Dignidad, Universalidad y Derechos Humanos. Revista Universidad de Cádiz 1: 247–64.
Michelini, Dorando J. (2010). Dignidad Humana En Kant y Habermas. Revista de Historiografía e Historia de Las Ideas 12(1): 41–49.
Naess, Arne. (2010). The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. Inquiry 16: 95–100.
O’Neill, Jonathan. (1992). The Varieties of Intrinsic Value. Edited by Sherwood J. B. Sugden. The Monist 75 (2): 119–37.
Oviedo, Atawallpa. (2016). Sumak Kawsay: Arte de Vivir En Armonía. De La Revolución Verde a Una Revolución Arcoíris. 5a. Quito-Ecuador: Sumak Editores.
Pacari, Nina. (2008). Naturaleza y Territorio Desde La Mirada de Los Pueblos Indígenas. In Antología Del Pensamiento Indigenista Ecuatoriano Sobre Sumak Kawsay, edited by Antonio Hidalgo-Capitán, Alejandro Guillén García, and Nancy Deleg Guazha, 127–32. Huelva: FIUCUHU / Universidad de Huelva (España).
Rice, David Lewis. (2016). Biocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Questions of Inherent Worth, Etiology, and Teleofunctional Interests. University of Arkansas.
Riechmann, Jorge. (2014). Debate: ¿Desarrollo Alternativo o Alternativas al Desarrollo? Otro Desarrollo.
Rolston, Holmes. (2010). Three Big Bangs: Matter-Energy, Life, Mind. Colorado: Columbia University Press.
Sandler Ronald. (2010). The Value of Species and the Ethical Foundations of Assisted Colonization. Conservation Biology, Volume 24, No. 2, 424–431.
Sandler, Ronald. (2012a). Intrinsic Value, Ecology, and Conservation. Nature Education
Sandler, R. (2012b). Is Artefactualness a Value-Relevant Property of Living Things? Synthese 185 (1): 89–102.
Sarayaku. (2003). Sarayaku Sumak Kawsayta Ñawpakma Katina Killka. In Antología Del Pensamiento Indigenista Ecuatoriano Sobre Sumak Kawsay, edited by Antonio Hidalgo-Capitán, Alejandro Guillén García, and Nancy Deleg Guazha, 79–102. Huelva y Cuenca: FIUCUHU / Universidad de Huelva (España).
Singer, Peter. (1986). All Animals Are Equal. Applied Ethics 1: 215–28.
Sterba, James P. (2000). Three Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tamayo, Luis. (2014). Debate: ¿Desarrollo Alternativo o Alternativas al Desarrollo? Otro Desarrollo.
Tatay Jaime. (2023). La ecoética frente al mal del ecocidio. Cauriensia, Vol. XVIII. 693-708.
Taylor, Paul W. (1984). Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants? Environmental Ethics 6 (2): 149–60.
Taylor, P. (1987). Inherent Value and Moral Rights. Source: The Monist Animal Rights 70 (1): 15–30.
Taylor, P. (1989). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. 2a ed. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, Paul W., and Dale. Jamieson. (2011). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. 2a ed. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
UNESCO. (2010). Etica Ambiental y Polt̕icas Internacionales. United Nations Educational.
Varner, Gary E. (1990). “Biological Functions and Biological Interest.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (2): 251–70.
Varner, G. (1998). In Nature’s Interests? Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Comments
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
Copyright (c) 2024 Pensamiento Actual