Keywords
Transactions costs
Franchising
Control mechanisms
Indirect supervision
How to Cite
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explain the use of indirect supervision as a control mechanism used by the franchisors for assuring standards and quality of service in the franchise framework, and to examine their presence under the agency and transaction cost theories. A qualitative research was developed based on 10 studies case of units franchised from national and foreign origin established in Venezuela. The results obtained showed (a) the preeminence of the contract as the general basis of the existence of different control mechanisms, (b) in application of the same contract, the use of forms of control are not necessarily specified, (c) the similar perception of effectiveness by franchisees in accordance to the controls applied by way of indirect supervision, and (d) the perceived variability in relations to the pleasure by the franchisees for the use of different mechanisms by way of indirect supervision.
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Copyright (c) 2010 Alberto Mirabal Martínez , Luis Sigala Paparella